December 16, 2009

This Annual Report is being provided to the Chicago Board of Education and the Illinois General Assembly pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, specifically 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e).

The School Code authorizes the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) for the Chicago Board of Education to conduct investigations into allegations of or incidents of waste, fraud, and financial mismanagement in public education within the jurisdiction of the Board. The OIG has also been charged with the responsibility of investigating allegations of various categories of employee misconduct.

This Annual Report is a summary of reports and investigations for Fiscal Year 2009, the period between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009. Other significant accomplishments that occurred in FY 2009 are also summarized.

The mission of the Office of the Inspector General is to ensure integrity in the operations of the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) by conducting meaningful, accurate and thorough investigations into allegations of waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG also reviews CPS systems, practices and procedures to determine their efficacy in preventing waste, fraud and financial mismanagement.

The OIG would like to thank the Chicago Board of Education and CPS administration for continued cooperation and support and its usually rapid response to reports and recommendations issued by the OIG.

James M. Sullivan
Inspector General
BUDGET

During Fiscal Year 2009, the Office of the Inspector General continued to perform its statutorily mandated function, despite continued budget and staffing constraints. In FY 2009, the OIG was allocated $1.8 million and was staffed with 17 full-time employees. Compared to oversight offices with similar responsibilities, the OIG is extremely under-funded and under-staffed. Despite these shortcomings, the OIG continues to conduct accurate, thorough and meaningful investigations resulting in increased integrity in CPS operations.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

In FY 09, the OIG received 1210 complaints alleging misconduct, waste, fraud and financial mismanagement within the Chicago Public School system. This total represents the largest number of complaints received in a reporting year by the OIG. These complaints included allegations of misconduct by CPS employees or vendors and allegations of students residing outside the City of Chicago and attending CPS. As illustrated below, the OIG continues to receive complaints and initiate investigations on an increasing number of allegations each year.
TRAINING

Many employees of the OIG are members of the Association of Inspectors General, a national organization of state, local and federal inspectors general and their staffs. The AIG offers training seminars and certification institutes for members as well as networking opportunities. Currently, five OIG employees have received the designation of Certified Inspector General after undergoing training by the AIG. Participation in the AIG also allows the OIG to be trained in best practices in the performance of the Inspector General function. Locally, the OIG collaborates with IG offices from other state and local agencies to train all staff in a variety of investigation and audit related areas.

INVESTIGATION STANDARDS

The OIG conducts its investigations in accordance with the Principles and Standards For Offices Of Inspector General, generally accepted principles, quality standards and best practices applicable to federal, state and local offices of inspectors general. In addition, the OIG, at all times, exercises due professional care in conducting its investigations and issuing its reports and recommendations.

FY 2009 UPDATES TO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INVESTIGATIONS

Federal Charges for Charter School Theft

In FY 05, the OIG reported the results of an investigation that revealed that a charter school founder and principal charged more than $250,000 on the school’s credit card and used school funds to pay for questionable expenditures that included, more than $32,000 for general merchandise including purchases from Lord & Taylor, Marshall Field’s, Louis Vuitton, Meystel’s Fashion, Coach, Bloomingdales, Saks Fifth Avenue, Elan Furs, Tommy Hilfiger and the Sky Mall Airline Catalog; more than $2,000 in hair care and cosmetic products; $5,800 for jewelry, $329 for appetite suppression pills; more than $18,000 in food and beverage expenses; $31,000 in expenditures for telephone and internet use; $71,000 in travel expenses; and hundreds of dollars in personal car repair expenses. The investigation also revealed that the principal commingled charter school funds with funds from another school in which she was involved and the principal made large disbursements to family members. Following the OIG report, the charter school agreement between CPS and the charter school was terminated. In FY 09, a grand jury impaneled by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicted the charter school principal for theft of charter school funds. The charges against the principal are pending. (3614)
Federal Criminal Convictions

In its FY 06 Annual Report, the OIG reported that a CPS contractor actually controlled a company that purported to be a certified minority business enterprise. The investigation determined that the majority-owned contractor controlled the MBE company and its work on a CPS sheltered market contract. In essence, the investigation revealed that employees of the majority-owned company prepared the MBE’s bid documents, handled invoicing for the MBE and had excessive control of the MBE’s business bank account, including transferring funds in and out of the MBE’s account. Following the OIG investigation, CPS debarred the majority-owned company, the MBE and another company involved in the contracting scam. The matter was referred to law enforcement and the majority-owned company owner and the MBE owner were both charged with the federal offense of mail fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In FY 08, both the owner of the majority-owned company and the MBE owner plead guilty to mail fraud for their roles in the minority contracting scam. In FY 09, the majority-owned company owner was sentenced to serve 41 months in a federal penitentiary. The minority-owned company owner was sentenced to two years of probation with the first year of probation served as home confinement with electronic home monitoring. (C294)

Fraudulent Purchasing Scheme

In FY 08, the OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that purchases of equipment by a central office department were orchestrated to circumvent Illinois law and Chicago Board of Education Rules and Policies concerning competitive bidding and Board approval of purchases. Specifically, a vendor orchestrated a scheme to reflect that the purchases of millions of dollars of equipment by CPS were purportedly made from ten separate vendors when in fact the purchases were made from the same vendor. In fact, the investigation revealed that one vendor created three other companies, purportedly run by his sister, a friend and another person, for the purpose of purporting to sell equipment to CPS. The scheming vendor also utilized six other vendors to sell equipment by simply using the vendors’ names and CPS vendor numbers on the purchases when in fact those purported suppliers did not perform any function in the transaction other than to send the scheming vendor the purchase orders and checks received from CPS in exchange for 3% of the purchase price.

In FY 09, based on the OIG investigation, CPS permanently debarred five of the vendors involved in the purchasing scheme from doing business with CPS and three other vendors were debarred for three years. (C349)

Payroll Case

In FY 08 the OIG reported on an investigation of a payroll fraud scheme involving nine CPS employees. The OIG investigation revealed that two employees assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused seven other employees to receive a total of least $141,285.64 in CPS funds to which they were not entitled. Specifically, the OIG
investigation revealed that a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $120,129.74 in payroll checks to be issued to a high school teacher, an elementary school teacher, a financial specialist, and two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the voucher coordinator received kickbacks from the CPS employees in exchange for causing the fraudulent payroll checks to be issued in their names. The OIG investigation also revealed that the high school teacher received money which was subsequently given to the voucher coordinator as a kickback from the school clerk in exchange for payroll checks being issued in the school clerk’s name for CPS funds to which the clerk was not entitled. The OIG investigation additionally revealed that a payroll adjustment clerk fraudulently caused at least $21,155.90 in payroll checks to be issued to two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the payroll adjustment clerk received kickbacks from the school clerks in exchange for causing payroll checks to be issued in their names for CPS funds to which they were not entitled.

During the course of the investigation, the matter was referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office for a criminal investigation. As a result of the joint investigation between the OIG and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, nine CPS employees were indicted by a Cook County Circuit Court grand jury. The two payroll department employees were charged with being the organizers of a continuing financial crimes enterprise, a Class X felony, as well as numerous other charges. The seven employees who received bogus checks were charged with various counts of theft and theft of school and government property.

Additionally, in FY 09, the OIG identified the 9th and 10th CPS employees involved in the payroll fraud scheme. These investigations are summarized later in this report. The 10th employee involved in the scheme has also been indicted by a Cook County Grand Jury and charges against this former employee are pending.

In FY 09, nine of the employees involved in the payroll fraud scheme all plead guilty to theft charges. Sentences of the former employees ranged from 6 months to 4 years of probation. The voucher coordinator who orchestrated payments of more than $120,000 to the other employees and received money in return, in addition to a term of probation, was also sentenced to 6 months in the Cook County Department of Corrections. Most defendants have been ordered to pay restitution and to date, CPS has received, or will receive during their terms of probation, more than $120,000 in restitution from the defendants.

**Homicide Investigation**

In FY 08, the OIG conducted an investigation after learning that a high school teacher shot and killed her estranged husband. During the course of the investigation, the OIG learned that the teacher shot her estranged husband after an altercation in which the teacher purportedly feared for her life. To date, criminal charges have not been filed against the teacher. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher had engaged in
prior acts of violence and threats to co-workers. Based on the OIG investigation, CPS sought to terminate the teacher for, among other charges, the shooting of her estranged husband without justification.

In FY 09, following an administrative hearing seeking the teacher’s dismissal, a hearing officer determined that there was no credible evidence to suggest that the teacher acted with any justification when she shot and killed her estranged husband and CPS proved this charge by a preponderance of the evidence. The hearing officer recommended that the teacher be dismissed. The Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation and the teacher was dismissed from CPS employment. (5695)

**Debarment**

In FY 08, the OIG reported on an investigation which revealed that a CPS vendor providing consulting services at various schools submitted falsified invoices to the schools which reflected dates and times that the vendor did not in fact work. Another investigation of the same vendor revealed that the vendor had a direct economic interest in a company as a partner while she was also a CPS employee, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the vendor showed a lack of business integrity by doing work for CPS under the vendor number of another company to circumvent a CPS Department of Procurement and Contracts decision to suspend the vendor’s vendor number during the course of the previous OIG investigation. In FY 09, the vendor was debarred by CPS and is permanently banned from doing business with CPS. (C353, 6355)

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**FISCAL YEAR 2009 INVESTIGATIONS**

In FY 09, the OIG issued 127 reports documenting investigations of alleged waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG conducted numerous other investigations of allegations that did not reveal evidence of wrongdoing. Pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e), the following are summaries of the OIG investigations for which reports were submitted in FY 09.

**Purchasing Law and Rule Violations**

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a CPS Officer created a purchase order for $1.56 million payable to a company without the required approval by the Chicago Board of Education. The Officer, and other employees involved, also failed to subject the $1.56 million contract to competitive bidding, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/34-21.3 of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(a). The investigation further revealed that if the Officer, and employees involved, believed the contract was for a non-biddable item, they failed to obtain the required approval of the Board to pay the company for a non-biddable item in excess of $25,000, in violation of
Board Rule 5-10; failed to request proposals/qualifications for a non-biddable item $250,001 and above, in violation of Board Rule 5-4.1(b); and/or failed to obtain the required approval of ¾ of the members of the Board for an emergency expenditure, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/10-20.21(xiv) of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(b)(xiv). In addition, the Officer, and other employees, failed to submit the $1.56 million contract to the CPS General Counsel for review prior to the execution of the contract, in violation of Board Rule 2-5.1.

In addition to the significant law, rule and policy violations, the OIG investigation revealed that the failure to subject the $1.56 million project to competitive bidding likely caused CPS to pay $1 million, or almost 200%, more for the project than it cost. In essence, CPS wasted $1 million.

Following the investigation, and in conjunction with findings of another investigation which is detailed below, the OIG recommended that CPS terminate the Officer. Based solely on this investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS terminate another employee involved in the improper letting of the contract and excessive payments to the contractor. The OIG also recommended that CPS pursue all legal remedies to recoup some portion of the $1.56 million paid to contractor based on the fact that under Board Rule 5-13 the contract was void. The Officer subsequently resigned from CPS and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The other employee was terminated and has also been designated ineligible to be rehired. In addition, the CPS Law Department successfully negotiated with the contractor and the contractor returned $250,000 to CPS. (7146)

In another investigation involving the same CPS Officer, the OIG found significant violations of Board Rules and policies concerning payments to a vendor and bidding requirements. The investigation revealed that the Board authorized payments to a CPS contractor for a professional service contract not to exceed $30,000,000 during its five-year contract with CPS. However, as the investigation revealed, CPS paid the contractor $38,328,632.83 in less than five years and an additional $6,750,151.47 in funds, encumbered by three open purchase orders, remained available to pay the contractor when the OIG reported its findings.

In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the CPS Officer acted with complete disregard for and in violation of Board Rules by requesting purchase orders totaling $20,772,015.47 in a one year period, and paying the contractor $14,081,874.52 during this same one-year period, far exceeding Board authority to pay the contractor. The investigation also revealed that an underling of the Officer violated Board Rules by approving 14 requisitions for purchase orders payable to the contractor, many of which exceeded Board authority to pay the contractor.

Based on a review of activities being engaged in by the contractor, the OIG found that CPS had purchased millions of dollars of equipment, a biddable item, through the contractor without subjecting the purchases to competitive bidding, in violation of Section 105 ILCS 5/34-21.3 of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rule 5-4(a).
Further, CPS did not have a written contract with a sub-contractor, a supplier of the equipment, or any other entity engaged in the program to install the equipment, which, in the opinion of the OIG subjected CPS to numerous risks that would be minimized by a formal contractual relationship.

Following this investigation, the OIG recommended that the Officer, based on this investigation and the one mentioned above, be terminated. Further, the OIG recommended that CPS determine the appropriateness of continuing to pay the contractor since continuing to pay the contractor would cause CPS to continue to engage in violations of the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules. Also, the OIG recommended that CPS determine if it desires to continue the equipment installation program and, if so, seek approval of the program and expenditures related to the program through formal Board processes and subject the program and expenditures to all necessary internal controls and subject all future purchases of equipment to competitive bidding as required by the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules.

Following the issuance of the OIG report containing its findings and recommendations, the Officer resigned from CPS employment and CPS implemented additional and necessary controls regarding the purchase of biddable items. (7300)

After advising CPS administration of the above findings, the OIG continued to investigate the contractual relationship between the contractor and CPS. Based on this investigation, the OIG reported additional findings, specifically:
  - Payments to the contractor in excess of Board authority were necessitated by an increase in the scope of services that the contractor was asked to perform during its contract period with CPS and pass-through payments made to individuals who performed services for CPS unrelated to the services performed by the contractor.
  - CPS failed to exercise appropriate and necessary contractor oversight of the contractor during the contract period which caused:
    - excessive overpayments to the contractor without Board authority;
    - a disincentive to the contractor to stay within the contractual compensation and reimbursement limits; and,
    - consultants in the contractor’s hierarchy to determine sub-consultant rates of pay and approve other consultant’s invoices.
  - The conduct of the contractor posed the risk of unethical conduct that CPS could better manage and control with a Contractor Code of Ethics.
  - Increased reliance on the contractor to perform an escalating level of services for CPS enhanced the risk of decreased CPS control over and accountability for the program.
  - A multiplier of 2.5 factored on the contractor’s labor rate, as well as the labor rate charged by many of the contractor’s sub-consultants, is unreasonable given the multitude of other accommodations and reimbursements afforded the contractor and its sub-consultants. This 2.5 markup alone accounted for more than $15,000,000 of payments to the contractor from October 2004 to January 2009.
  - A program managed by the contractor and a sub-consultant expanded since 2004 and created additional costs charged by the contractor, however the program
passed on unreasonable charges to CPS, including markups on student and mentor labor.

- Employees of a sub-consultant, who managed a program under the supervision of the contractor, were not subjected to criminal background checks despite being in direct, daily contact with CPS students, in violation of the School Code of Illinois (105 ILCS 5/34-18.5(f)).

Based on these findings, the OIG made the following recommendations:

1. CPS must ensure that all payments to the contractor that are pass-throughs to individuals and companies that do not perform services related to the agreement with the contractor are immediately stopped.
2. CPS must begin exercising appropriate and necessary management of the contractor, or any company subsequently performing a similar function, to ensure that services are provided within scope and within spending authorization.
3. CPS should determine the appropriate labor rates charged by consultants and sub-consultants working on the contract.
4. CPS should enact a Contractor Code of Ethics which, at the very least, requires written CPS approval for a contractor to hire a relative of the company’s management team, especially a relative of identified key personnel; and requires contractor disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest that arise during the term of an engagement, specifically disclosure of any direct or indirect economic interest a consultant may have in relation to CPS or other members of the contractor’s management team.
5. CPS should establish appropriate wage markup provisions utilized by consultants that are specifically and transparently agreed to in contract documents and that are weighed against all other accommodations afforded to consultants by CPS.
6. CPS should reconsider the current structure of one of the programs managed by the contractor and a sub-consultant, and establish a more cost-effective mechanism to have those services performed, to ensure compliance with applicable procurement laws and rules and to mentor students. In addition, CPS should establish acceptable wage rates and markups charged by mentors and establish minimum certification and/or education requirements for mentors.
7. CPS should immediately require that all contract and sub-consultant personnel who have direct daily contact with students be subjected to fingerprint based criminal background checks. (7300)

**Failure to Pay Rent**

- In another revelation of waste and inefficiency, the OIG issued a report substantiating an allegation that a local elected public official occupied CPS owned property for seven years after the termination of a lease of the property without paying rent or leasehold taxes. Specifically, the OIG found that the official occupied CPS owned property for more than 14 years pursuant to various leases with CPS. However, the OIG investigation revealed that since 2002, the official has occupied the property without a lease. In addition, the OIG found that CPS administration had acquiesced to
the official’s tenancy of the property by failing to either enter into a new lease with the official or evict the official, thereby making the official a holdover tenant liable for the payment of rent to CPS at the rate of the last lease, $1,534.70 per month. Since the official had not paid rent to CPS for the period of time since the expiration of the lease while still occupying the property, the official, at the time of the OIG report, owed CPS $74,914.80.

The OIG investigation further revealed that as a leaseholder of publicly owned property, the official has been responsible for the payment of leasehold taxes to Cook County for at least the last twenty years. At the time of the OIG report, these leasehold taxes totaled $157,526.76, with penalties for non-payment totaling $286,912.02. As such, leasehold taxes and penalties owed to Cook County by the official totaled $444,638.78.

Based on its investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS take immediate action to evict the official from CPS property, collect all rent owed to CPS by the official since the expiration of the lease, and seek all legal remedies to force the official to pay leasehold taxes owed to Cook County. (7504)

**Misappropriation of Funds**

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school principal made unbridled purchases of more than $67,000.00 in photography equipment with school funds over a two year period using a CPS credit card, purchase orders and school funds. In addition, more than $41,000.00 in equipment, including $17,000.00 in photography equipment and more than $24,000.00 in other technology equipment, could not be located at the school since being purchased during the two school years while the principal was in charge of the elementary school. The OIG investigation also revealed that the principal utilized school staff to do work on his personal photography during school hours and while the staff members were on duty with CPS; the principal received his full CPS salary for six days when he was in fact under contract with another school district to be a principal of an elementary school; the principal engaged in the unauthorized use of sick time in that he utilized sick time with CPS while working for the other school district; and, the principal resided in Crete, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy.

Based on its investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS should utilize all legal remedies to recoup $2,980.33 in CPS salary that the principal received for the six days when he was under contract with the other school district; that CPS should utilize all legal remedies to recoup $2,483.61 in sick pay that the principal received to which he was not entitled; and, that CPS should enact more stringent controls to monitor school-based purchases, made either through the purchase order process, via P-Cards or with payments from school internal accounts, to prevent principals from misdirecting school funds and making unbridled purchases of arguably unnecessary equipment and supplies.
Following the OIG investigation, the principal, who resigned during the course of the investigation, was designated ineligible to be rehired. (6955)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school principal misappropriated school funds by allowing six non-teaching staff members, including two members of the Local School Council, to attend a four-day conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada, which was ostensibly for teachers and administrators. The investigation also revealed that the principal utilized more than $1,200.00 in school funds to pay for a non-teaching staff member to travel and stay in Las Vegas, Nevada purportedly to attend the conference for educators, yet the non-teaching staff member was not registered for the conference and did not ultimately attend any conference sessions. In addition, the principal failed to obtain approval to attend the conference by his department head. The principal was issued a five-day suspension. (7261)

**Payroll Case**

- As reported above, in FY 08 the OIG investigated and reported a payroll fraud scheme involving nine CPS employees. The OIG investigation revealed that two employees assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused seven other employees to receive a total of at least $141,285.64 in CPS funds to which they were not entitled. In FY 09, the OIG identified another school clerk as also being a participant in the payroll fraud scheme. The OIG investigation of the school clerk revealed that in this same payroll scheme, a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $13,618.27 in gross CPS payroll checks to be issued to the school clerk to which she was not entitled. The school clerk was terminated from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. Criminal charges against the clerk are pending. (6610)

- An elementary school teacher also took part in the payroll scheme and the OIG investigation revealed that a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $16,846.40 in CPS payroll checks to be issued to the teacher to which she was not entitled. The teacher resigned and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The teacher plead guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to serve a term of 12 months of probation and was ordered to pay $3,000 restitution to CPS. (6610)

**Stringing Purchases to Avoid Internal Controls**

- The OIG reviewed the procurement of city-wide equipment repair services by a central office department for compliance with purchasing rules put forth in the School Code of Illinois and Board Rules. The OIG review produced the following findings:
  - For five fiscal years, the central office department in charge of the services opened aggregate purchase orders in excess of $13 million and issued purchase orders to vendors that:
    - did not have contracts with CPS;
    - were not required to have liability insurance;
had not engaged in a competitive process to obtain work with CPS in amounts exceeding dollar thresholds that require competitive bidding; and,
- were not required to establish their qualifications or provide licenses to CPS.
  - For five fiscal years, the central office department issued purchase orders to more than thirty vendors per year, in aggregate amounts in excess of $10,000, without subjecting the awards to competitive bidding, contrary to Board Rules which require competitive bidding and Board approval.
  - For five fiscal years, the central office department had issued purchase orders to about two dozen vendors per year, in aggregate amounts in excess of $25,000, without subjecting the awards to competitive bidding, contrary to the School Code of Illinois.
  - The central office department erroneously treated as emergency services work that was clearly foreseeable and for which the department should have anticipated and planned.
  - A second central office department improperly removed controls from a budget line allowing the central office department procuring the repair services to open aggregate purchase orders for individual vendors in excess of established dollar thresholds requiring contracts and competitive bidding.
  - The lack of necessary controls on expenditures for the equipment repair services, which average $2.7 million annually, unnecessarily increased the risk of over-billing, fraudulent payments, and other types of employee and vendor misconduct.

Based on its review, the OIG recommended that the central office department, in conjunction with other central office departments involved in internal controls, develop a process by which the equipment repair could be accomplished in a timely fashion and in a manner consistent with current procurement law and Board Rules. Specifically, the OIG recommended the following:
  - That CPS determines, through a five-year sampling, the nature of the equipment repair services required and the cost of such services. Based on this information, the central office department should be able to specifically identify the nature of its annual equipment repair needs and the costs associated with these services.
  - The central office department should prepare a Request for Qualifications ("RFQ") seeking vendors that are able to perform one or more of the equipment repair services identified by the department, with prices for each type of repair service identified.
  - The RFQ should require that responders have the appropriate insurance for vendors who perform the equipment repair and appropriate certifications and/or licenses associated with the specific aspects of the equipment repair services.
  - Upon receiving the RFQ responses, the central office department should pre-qualify vendors meeting the requirements of the RFQ that are willing and able to perform the services required at established rates based on a review of the previous five fiscal years of such services.
  - Board approval of the RFQ and the pre-qualification pool.
  - A formal evaluation process to rate vendors who perform the equipment repair services on behalf of CPS with established benchmarks and ensure that such benchmarks are met. The central office department should regularly review such
evaluations to determine whether the vendor should remain as a pre-qualified vendor. The evaluation process should include a regular review of the frequency of use of each vendor to identify any hint of favoritism in the recurring use of any vendor(s).

As a result of the OIG investigation, the central office department has begun the processes recommended by the OIG which would establish the necessary controls on the large expenditure of CPS funds. (7771)

**OIG Warning to P-Card Users**

In response to a 2008 Illinois Supreme Court decision (*People v. Howard*, 228 Ill.2d 428, 885 N.E.2d 85) affirming the propriety of criminal charges and the conviction of a public employee who used a government issued credit card for personal use despite the fact that the employee paid the money back when the credit card bill came due, the OIG issued a memorandum containing recommendations advising CPS administration to issue additional warnings to employees who are issued CPS corporate credit cards.

The OIG recommendations included:

1. That a proposed CPS Policy regarding Procurement Cards include a warning that misuse of a P-Card, in addition to disciplinary action, also subjects the employee to criminal charges even if the employee reimburses CPS for the personal charges, and,
2. That all P-Card users, approvers, and reviewers be routinely and specifically reminded that use of the P-Card for personal or non-CPS related purposes may subject the individual to the criminal charge of Official Misconduct which carries a penalty of two to five years of imprisonment and which, upon conviction, will lead to the forfeiture of one’s CPS pension.

**Payroll Department Recommendations**

- The OIG conducted an investigation after it learned that the Department of Payroll Services incorrectly processed a direct deposit authorization form submitted by an employee which resulted in four payroll checks of another employee with a similar name being deposited into the bank account of the employee who filed the direct deposit authorization form. During the course of its review, the OIG also learned of another incorrectly processed direct deposit authorization form which resulted in an employee’s paycheck being deposited in another employee’s bank account. The OIG investigation further revealed that the erroneous processing of the direct deposit authorization forms was not the result of fraudulent activity but the result of a lack of specific procedures to be followed in the processing of direct deposit authorization forms and a lack of any attention to detail in the processing of those forms by a Department of Payroll Services employee and interns. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended the following:
That CPS act as quickly as possible to ensure that a self-service link on PeopleSoft allowing employees to personally enroll in payroll direct deposit, or to change their direct deposit designation, is operational.

That, until the time that PeopleSoft self-service link with regards to direct deposit is operational, the Department of Payroll Services enact specific procedures outlining all of the steps to be taken to ensure that the inputted direct deposit information corresponds to the appropriate employee.

That, until the time that a PeopleSoft self-service link with regards to direct deposit is operational, CPS re-draft the Authorization for Direct Deposit or Pay Card Form to require additional personal identification information to ensure that the inputted direct deposit information corresponds to the appropriate employee. (7054)

**Failure to Cooperate with the OIG**

In FY 07, a Board Rule was enacted by the Chicago Board of Education that codifies current case law and further warns employees of their specific duties regarding administrative investigations conducted by the OIG. Board Rule 4-4m obligates all CPS employees to cooperate with the OIG during its investigations. Specifically, all employees interviewed by the OIG who are advised of “Administrative Rights” may not refuse to answer questions based upon the assertion of that employee’s privilege against self-incrimination. Any employee who refuses to answer questions during an interview with the OIG after receiving a notice of administrative rights shall be considered flagrantly insubordinate and to have grossly disrupted the educational process within the meaning of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Any employee who refuses to answer questions posed by the OIG, after receipt of a notice of administrative rights, shall be subject to dismissal from employment.

- The OIG conducted an investigation following the issuance of a Warning Resolution to a high school teacher who, in FY 08, had failed to cooperate with the OIG and answer questions following his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. During this second investigation, the teacher again refused to answer questions by investigators from the OIG regarding certain details surrounding his arrest for the offenses of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and possession of cannabis, after being advised of administrative rights, in violation of Board Rule 4-4(m) and contrary to the directives for improvement contained within the Warning Resolution. Based on his continued failure to cooperate with the OIG and his actions in contradiction of the directives contained in the Warning Resolution, the OIG recommended that the teacher be terminated. CPS subsequently terminated the teacher for failure to cooperate with the OIG. (7069)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school teacher was arrested and charged with the offenses of public indecency, resisting arrest, and violating the Chicago Park District Code. During an interview with the OIG, the teacher refused to answer questions by OIG investigators regarding certain details surrounding his arrest after being advised of administrative rights, in violation of Board Rule 4-4(m), the School Code of Illinois and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The
teacher subsequently plead guilty to misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to 12 months conditional discharge and 100 hours of community service. After a hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education, the teacher’s termination for failure to cooperate with the OIG, as well as other violations, was upheld. (7293)

Ethics Violations

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a school clerk assistant assigned to an elementary school which revealed that the school clerk utilized confidential information regarding a former CPS employee for her own personal use and not in the performance of her official duties and responsibilities, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. (6713)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school assistant principal supervised his sister who was hired as a school security officer at the high school, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. (6851)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a member of a high school local school council who was a former CPS employee on a miscellaneous payroll. The OIG investigation revealed that the LSC member solicited and received $100.00 from a teacher assigned to the high school, purportedly for her attendance at a principal orientation training seminar for prospective principals, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. Additionally, during the course of the investigation, the LSC member failed to appear in response to a subpoena issued by the Office of the Inspector General, in violation of the School Code of Illinois. The OIG recommended that the LSC member be removed from his position on the local school council, pursuant to Board Rule 6-29. Additionally, the OIG also recommended that CPS place a do not hire (“DNH”) on the CPS personnel records of the former CPS employee. (7672)

Misuse of Grant Funds

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that grant funds received by a central office department were misappropriated and that the funds were used to buy items, including iPods, for staff members. The OIG investigation revealed that the central office department purchased fifty-eight iPods utilizing Title II, Part D, Enhancing Education Through Technology grant funds, and many of the iPods were not utilized for purposes consistent with the grant. The OIG investigation further revealed that at least sixteen of these fifty-eight iPods purchased by the central office department remained unaccounted for at the time of the investigation. The OIG investigation also revealed that the central office department’s records regarding the distribution and current whereabouts of the iPods were not maintained in accordance with the grant agreement and best practices. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS conduct periodic audits of CPS departments that are awarded grant funds to ensure that grant funds are being utilized consistently with the grant and that equipment purchased pursuant to a grant is utilized consistently with
the objectives and guidelines of the grant. The OIG also recommended that CPS ensure that the central office department in question adopt inventory procedures to ensure that the in-take and distribution of all property purchased by and distributed by the department is accurately documented. (6400)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school teacher which revealed that for a period of nine months, the teacher utilized $10,000 of grant money awarded to the school for his personal use, in violation of the Constitution of Illinois, the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher obtained and accepted secondary employment with at least four local colleges and universities without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The teacher was subsequently issued a warning resolution. (6854)

**Falsification of Attendance Records**

- An OIG investigation revealed that a custodial worker assigned to an elementary school falsified his attendance records on several occasions in that he swiped-in at another school because he was running late in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment. (6915)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a school security aide at a high school swiped in a teacher on numerous occasions when the teacher was not at the school working. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher was excessively tardy, in that on numerous occasions she arrived at school after her scheduled start time of 8:00 a.m. and on some occasions arrived after the start time of her first class at 8:44 a.m. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher made a false statement during an interview with the OIG. All of these activities by the teacher and security aide were contrary to the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired and the security aide retired from CPS in lieu of termination. (6602)

- After receiving complaints alleging that an elementary school lunchroom manager falsified attendance records, the OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that the lunchroom manager, on numerous occasions, represented on CPS Daily Record of Employees’ Time forms that she arrived at work at 6:00 a.m. when in fact she did not. The OIG investigation further revealed that the lunchroom manager engaged in secondary employment without notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, and engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with the duties and demands of her position in that she conducted activities on behalf of her secondary employment positions while on duty with CPS, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the lunchroom manager was inattentive to her duty, in that she left cash collected from the lunchroom on her desk.
The engineer resided in Dixmoor, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy.
- The engineer falsified his attendance records in that he represented that he was working when in fact he was not at his school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.
- The engineer engaged in activities at a car wash that he owned which conflicted with his CPS duties, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education.
- The school business manager assigned to the same school as the engineer, swiped-in the engineer as working when in fact he was not at the school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.
- The elementary school principal allowed employees to store their CPS employee identification cards near the school’s Kronos machine which allowed employees to easily swipe-in for a co-worker when in fact the co-worker is not present for work.

Following the OIG investigation, the engineer was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6787)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher utilized sick leave in an unauthorized manner in that he utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but on a personal trip to Florida, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school’s principal approved the use of sick time in an unauthorized manner, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The principal subsequently retired and the teacher received school based discipline. (6597)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that two elementary school custodians and a contract custodian falsified their attendance records in that they represented that they were working when in fact they left school property for more than two hours beyond their lunch and break periods. The CPS custodians were issued a five day suspension. (7269)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school custodial worker and two privatized custodial workers assigned to the same high school falsified their attendance records in that each was represented as working when in fact he was not at the school. The OIG investigation further revealed that the three men falsified attendance records in that each swiped-out another. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that one of the privatized custodial workers drank and possessed alcoholic beverages while at work. The CPS custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7175)
An OIG investigation revealed that an engineer assigned to an elementary school falsified his attendance records, in that on at least ninety-six occasions, during a thirteen month period, he fraudulently misrepresented that he was on duty at the school when in fact he was at a fitness facility. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that on at least ten occasions in less than a one month period, he represented that he was on duty at the school when he was also recorded as working at a non-CPS facility. The engineer resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. (6320)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher falsified his attendance records in that on numerous occasions he had a co-worker, another high school teacher, swipe him out when in fact he had already left the school a school period earlier. One of the teachers involved in the scheme to falsify attendance records was terminated, the other faces pending disciplinary action. (7625)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an engineer assigned to an elementary school and a custodial worker employed by a CPS vendor which revealed that the engineer falsified her attendance records in that on numerous occasions she had the contract custodial worker swipe her in the morning when in fact she was not yet at school, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Additionally, the engineer made at least two false statements during an interview with the OIG, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The engineer was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7298)

**Falsification of School Records**

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher, who was also the school’s dean of attendance, failed to ensure that the attendance of students was accurately recorded. The investigation revealed that the teacher instructed the school’s attendance office staff to submit default attendance in IMPACT, the CPS student record and attendance keeping application, when a teacher failed to submit attendance in a timely fashion and made little effort to ensure that the teacher’s actual documented class attendance was subsequently obtained and accurately recorded in IMPACT. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher failed to ensure that the attendance of students was accurately recorded in that on various occasions the actual student attendance submitted by substitute teachers was ignored and default attendance was recorded in IMPACT reflecting students as present when in fact they were not present. (6684)

**Misuse of the Internet**

An OIG investigation revealed that a central office employee posted sexually explicit personal ads online and accessed pornographic photographs sent in response to the postings via the CPS network while at work, in violation of the Member Acceptable
Use of the CPS Network policy. The employee was laid off and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7065)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a central office employee, during more than a three month period, received and sent several e-mails containing pornographic images via the CPS network and/or the employee’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7325)

- An investigation of a CPS professional revealed that during a one-month period the professional sent and received e-mails containing pornographic images via the professional’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7330)

- An employee of a vendor was investigated for misuse of the CPS network and the investigation revealed that the vendor’s employee sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the employee’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7337)

- An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school principal received and sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the principal’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7343)

- An OIG investigation of an assistant principal revealed that the assistant principal sent an e-mail containing a pornographic image via the assistant principal’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7347)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a central office employee sent an e-mail containing pornographic images via the CPS network to a co-worker’s CPS e-mail account, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (7383)

- A substitute teacher was investigated for misuse of the CPS network and the investigation revealed that the substitute teacher, while assigned to an elementary school, utilized a classroom computer and the CPS network to access a website containing sexually explicit images, in violation of the Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. The substitute teacher was terminated and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7441)

**Vendor Misconduct**

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a vendor providing services to a central office department. The OIG investigation revealed the following:
  - The vendor had previously resigned from her position with CPS in the central office department and a do not hire was placed on her employment record following an investigation by the OIG which revealed that, when an employee, the vendor resided outside the City of Chicago. Shortly thereafter, the vendor
obtained a CPS vendor number and began performing services for the central office department where she had worked.

- The vendor was paid in excess of $25,000, through various budget units of the central office department for services provided to the department during fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 without obtaining the required approval of the Chief Purchasing Officer, in violation of Board Rule 5-4.1.

- The payments made to the vendor were divided or strung among various purchase orders payable through various budget units within the central office, despite the fact that the vendor provided services only to the one central office department, in order to avoid the Board Rule requirement that the Chief Purchasing Officer approve agreements for non-biddable items in excess of $25,000.00, in violation of Board Rule 5-30 and the Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 33E-18.

- The vendor provided services to the central office department in excess of $25,000.00 without the agreement being evidenced by a written contract, in violation of Board Rule 2-5.1.

Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended the following:

- CPS immediately cease doing business with the vendor and debar the vendor from doing business with CPS in the future.

- CPS take appropriate disciplinary action against several CPS employees – a director, a senior manager, a chief officer, and a business manager assigned to the central office department who was the husband of the vendor - for their roles in approving purchase orders payable to the vendor in violation of Board Rules and the Illinois Criminal Code.

- CPS initiate a policy requiring the Department of Procurement and Contracts, prior to granting a vendor number to a prospective vendor, to determine whether the vendor has been a CPS employee in the past, and if so, whether a do not hire or “DNH” was placed on the former employee’s file. If the Department of Procurement and Contracts determines that a do not hire was placed on the CPS file of the prospective vendor when the prospective vendor left CPS employment, the policy should further require the Department of Procurement and Contracts to obtain the approval of the Law Department prior to issuing the prospective vendor a CPS vendor number.

Debarment proceedings against the vendor are pending. (7093)

➢ The OIG conducted an investigation of a vendor after receiving an allegation that the vendor was not an authorized reseller of a product it was offering to sell CPS pursuant to a competitive bid the vendor had submitted. The OIG investigation confirmed the allegation and in addition found that the vendor misrepresented, in its response to the CPS solicitation, that it maintained an inventory of the product in question, when in fact it admittedly did not have any of the items in its inventory. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS determine whether the vendor’s misrepresentations were material to its solicitation response. If CPS
determined that the vendor’s misrepresentations were material to the solicitation response, such finding should serve as grounds to deem the vendor not responsive. Likewise, if CPS determined that the misrepresentations by the vendor were material, CPS should institute debarment proceedings against the vendor in that material misrepresentations reflect a lack of business integrity. As a result of the OIG investigation, CPS issued another solicitation for the products contained in the original solicitation. (7133)

**Misuse of CPS Services**

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school a teacher utilized the CPS e-mail system to transmit e-mails to numerous CPS employees regarding non-CPS related business, in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. (6934)

- A similar OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher utilized Board services without authorization, in that he utilized the CPS mail run system to distribute envelopes for non-CPS related business, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. (7359)

**Mistreatment of CPS students**

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school teacher following an allegation that he physically abused a fourth grade student. The OIG investigation revealed that the evidence obtained by the OIG supported the findings of a previous investigation conducted by another CPS department, specifically that credible evidence did not exist to support the allegation that the teacher slammed the student into a desk, and that credible evidence did exist to support the finding that the teacher restrained the student in an effort to keep him from causing bodily harm to himself and other students. However, during the course of the OIG investigation, several students stated to the OIG that the teacher used a belt to strike various students. The OIG investigation of this allegation revealed that the teacher used corporal punishment that resulted in the deliberate use of physical force with a student, in that the teacher struck two elementary school students with a belt, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7614)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school kindergarten teacher following an allegation that the teacher physically abused students. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher used corporal punishment that resulted in the deliberate use of physical force with students, in that she struck two kindergarten students on the buttocks with a belt; she struck another student with a belt; she struck two students on the buttocks with her hand; and, struck another student approximately twenty times with a belt on his legs as “birthday licks”, in a manner that was “definitely harder than a tap causing a slight sting.” All of these acts were in violation of the Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy and contrary to the CPS
Following an allegation that a high school student was strip-searched, and an investigation of the incident by another CPS department, the OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher and a school security officer. Based on the fact that an attorney for the student allegedly strip-searched would not allow his client to be interviewed by the OIG, the OIG could not make any findings concerning the alleged strip search of the student. However, the OIG investigation revealed that the teacher made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official investigation, in that he made directly conflicting statements during interviews by two other CPS departments and the OIG. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school security officer also made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official inquiry, investigation, or other official proceeding, in that he made directly conflicting statements during interviews by two other CPS departments and the OIG. The security officer was subsequently laid off from CPS employment. (7651)

**Miscellaneous Investigations**

The OIG completed three investigations of a school clerk assistant assigned to a high school. During the course of the OIG investigations, the school clerk assistant resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. The investigations revealed that the school clerk assistant had engaged in various activities which violated Board rules and policies, including the following:

- The school clerk assistant, while a CPS employee and contemporaneously the director of operations for a not-for-profit organization, signed contracts between CPS and the not-for-profit entity, on behalf of the not-for-profit entity for the installation and use of sports fields on a high school campus. As such, the school clerk assistant had a direct economic interest in a contract of the Board, where the expense, price or consideration of the contract was authorized by action of the Board, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

- The school clerk assistant, on several occasions, failed to return to work on time after lunch, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The school clerk assistant spent significant time daily working on the sports fields on the high school campus while on CPS time, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy and contrary to the written agreement between CPS and the not-for-profit entity which called for the not-for-profit entity to provide field maintenance.

- The school clerk assistant falsified his attendance records, in that he represented that he was working when in fact he was not performing CPS related activities, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

- The school clerk assistant allowed an expelled CPS student, who never attended the high school and was not attending a CPS school, to play in a baseball game for the high school, despite the school clerk assistant receiving a written warning in
2001 for allowing athletically ineligible students to compete in interscholastic sports.
- The school clerk assistant was insubordinate, in that on numerous occasions he failed to carry out his principal’s directive to not bring the expelled CPS student onto the high school campus, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

The OIG also pointed out in its report to CPS administration that on four previous occasions, the school clerk assistant was disciplined by CPS or resigned prior to disciplinary action. On the occasion where the school clerk resigned prior to being disciplined by CPS, a do not hire was placed on his file, but nevertheless the school clerk assistant was subsequently re-hired by CPS. (6371, 6528, 7112)

- Later in the year, following the release of the OIG reports regarding the school clerk assistant mentioned above, the OIG learned that the former school clerk assistant had returned to the high school as a volunteer assistant boy’s baseball coach despite having a “do not hire” on his personnel records. As a result of this new revelation, the investigations mentioned above and an extensive disciplinary history, the OIG informed CPS administration that continuing to allow the coach to be affiliated with CPS presented a serious risk to CPS that the coach would engage in future misconduct if he is allowed to be involved in any CPS activities, even as a volunteer assistant baseball coach. The OIG recommended that the coach not be allowed to serve as a volunteer assistant boy’s baseball coach at the high school or to be involved in any other way with a CPS activity. (7514)

- The OIG conducted an investigation that revealed that a health service nurse violated a Loaned Equipment Agreement that she signed to obtain a CPS issued laptop computer by failing to safeguard the laptop since it was stolen at an airport in Mexico and by failing to report the loss of the computer to her supervisor within twenty-four hours. The OIG investigation also revealed that the nurse used a total of four sick days in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized sick days when in fact she was not sick but utilized the sick days for personal travel, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The nurse was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be hired. (6751)

- The OIG conducted four investigations which revealed that CPS employees cashed their original paychecks after claiming that they did not receive the original paycheck and after being issued and cashing a replacement check.
  - A cook assigned to an elementary school cashed a CPS payroll check for $711.78 after claiming that she did not receive the check and after receiving and cashing a CPS replacement check. (6922)
  - An employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to a central office department cashed a CPS payroll check in the amount of $281.45 after claiming that she did not receive the check and after receiving a replacement check which she subsequently also cashed. The employee was terminated from CPS employment. (7428)
Another employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to an elementary school cashed a CPS payroll check in the amount of $679.16 after representing that she did not receive the check and after receiving and cashing a CPS replacement check in the amount of $679.16. The employee was terminated and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7569)

An employee on a miscellaneous payroll assigned to a central office department cashed two CPS payroll checks totaling $801.46 after claiming that he did not receive the checks and after receiving and cashing CPS replacement checks for those two checks. The employee was terminated from CPS employment. (7018)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher made false certifications on applications to the Chicago Housing Choice Voucher Program, in that he failed to include his income from CPS employment, causing the Chicago Housing Authority to provide rent subsidies totaling $49,337.00 during a five to six year period on his behalf to which he was not entitled. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6407)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school special education classroom assistant, who was also a girl’s basketball coach, placed an order for sports equipment without the pre-approval of the principal, contrary to the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. The special education classroom assistant resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6701)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher failed to notify the CPS Ethics Officer that she engaged in secondary employment with the Chicago Transit Authority, in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Board of Education and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher also utilized sick time with CPS when in fact she was not sick, in that on thirteen occasions she worked at her job with the Chicago Transit Authority on the same days that she represented to CPS that she was sick, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. This employee also resided in Glenwood, Illinois, in violation of the CPS Residency Policy. This investigation is also mentioned in the Residency section of this report. During the course of the OIG investigation, the teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6021)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher improperly used a CPS tax-exempt letter when she purchased a $1.00 bottle of lemonade at a local dollar store. The investigation also revealed that the teacher not only used the CPS tax-exempt letter to save seven cents at the dollar store, but also had used the CPS tax-exempt letter to make personal purchases, including purchases of shoes, clothes, groceries, perfume and many other items from retail stores like Walgreen’s, Dominick’s, Marshall Fields, Whole Foods and Water Tower stores. The teacher admitted to the OIG that she had been using the CPS tax-exempt letter to avoid paying tax on personal purchases for 5 years. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher thought that using the CPS tax-exempt letter to avoid paying taxes on
personal purchases was appropriate since, when she obtained her new CPS ID Plus Card in 2003, the card was advertised as providing "special offers" to CPS teachers, including tax-exempt purchases at various retailers. The OIG also learned during the course of its investigation, that the CPS website contained a page listing the functions and benefits of the CPS ID Plus Card, which included a bullet point under a section entitled “…Special Offers for Teachers” indicating that the ID card could be used for tax-exempt purchases at various retailers. The OIG subsequently learned that utilization of the ID Plus Card for tax-exempt purchases at various retailers was a concept that was never implemented. Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS, in addition to taking disciplinary action against the teacher, should revise its website reference to the ID Plus Card being used to make tax-exempt purchases at various retailers since that is apparently not a current function of the CPS ID card and may confuse CPS employees. Following the OIG investigation and recommendations, the teacher was issued a warning resolution and CPS removed reference to tax-exempt purchases using the ID Plus Card from its website.

(6753)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school military instructor falsified employment records by representing that he had earned a master’s degree from two universities when in fact those entities were not legitimate educational institutions but “diploma mills”, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the instructor misappropriated more than $13,000.00 of CPS funds when he requested and received a higher rate of pay as a military instructor who had a master’s degree, when in fact his master’s degree was not legitimately earned, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. In addition to taking the appropriate disciplinary action against the instructor, the OIG also recommended that CPS utilize all legal remedies to recoup more than $13,000.00 from the instructor in salary and pension benefits that were paid to him based on his representation that he had a legitimate master’s degree when in fact he did not. In addition, the OIG recommended that CPS review its procedures regarding the processing of lane adjustments since despite the fact that the instructor’s request for a lane advancement was rejected by CPS Salary Administration, Staffing & Enrollment because his master’s degree was from a diploma mill, he still received the higher rate of pay as military instructor who has a master’s degree. Following the OIG investigation, the instructor was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7118)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school assistant principal failed to show-up to perform her duties at the elementary school to which she was assigned but swiped-in and out at a high school despite not being assigned a position at the high school. The investigation also revealed that the high school principal allowed the assistant principal to perform services at the high school and accepted “volunteer” services from the assistant principal despite the fact that the assistant was still assigned to the elementary school. Following the OIG investigation, the principal was issued a 10-day suspension. (7198)
The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school special education teacher which revealed that:

- The teacher engaged in secondary employment at a camp in Colorado which conflicted with her CPS duties and obtained, accepted and engaged in that secondary employment without first notifying the CPS ethics officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Chicago Board of Education.
- The teacher committed the criminal offense of forgery in that she made and delivered a document capable of defrauding another in such a manner that it purports to have been made by another, when she forged a letter purportedly from her father’s doctor in order to provide justification for sick days when in fact she was engaging in secondary employment in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.
- The teacher falsified employment records when she forged a letter purportedly from her father’s doctor in order to provide justification for sick days when in fact she was engaging in secondary employment in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.
- The teacher utilized sick days in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized sick days when neither she nor a family member was sick but in fact she was engaging in secondary employment at a camp in Colorado, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.
- The teacher made numerous false statements during an interview as part of an official investigation by the OIG, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy.

The teacher subsequently resigned from CPS employment. (7201)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher, during a nine year period, understated and misrepresented her income on applications for free and reduced-price meals submitted on behalf of two of her children, enabling them to receive free meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The fraudulent representations by the teacher potentially resulted in more than $8,000.00 in free meal benefits being provided to the teacher’s two children despite the fact that they were ineligible for such benefits. The OIG investigation further revealed that during a five year period, a guidance counselor assistant assigned to the same elementary school, understated and misrepresented her family’s income on applications for free and reduced-price meals submitted on behalf of two of her children, enabling them to receive free meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The fraudulent representations by the guidance counselor assistant potentially resulted in more than $4,300.00 in free meal benefits being provided to the guidance counselor assistant’s two children despite the fact that they were ineligible for such benefits. During the course of the investigation, the guidance counselor assistant was laid off from her position. Subsequent to the investigation, the guidance counselor assistant was designated as ineligible to be rehired. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (6853)
The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a school security officer assigned to an elementary school engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with his CPS employment, in that the security officer engaged in secondary employment while on sick time with CPS; accepted secondary employment without first notifying the CPS ethics officer; utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that he utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but working his second job; took a medical leave of absence on fraudulent grounds, in that he requested and took a medical leave of absence in order to work at his second job; and, was granted a CPS leave of absence for his own personal illness and worked secondary employment during the period of the leave, all in violation of Board rules and policies. During the course of the OIG investigation the security officer resigned from his position with CPS. Following the OIG investigation, the school security officer was designated ineligible to be rehired. (7178)

The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed the following:

- The teacher engaged in secondary employment which conflicted with CPS employment, in that she engaged in employment with another school district while on sick time with CPS;
- The teacher obtained and accepted secondary employment with the other school district without first notifying the CPS ethics officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education;
- The teacher utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that she utilized CPS sick time when she was working at the other school district; and,
- The teacher requested and took a medical leave of absence on fraudulent grounds, in that she requested and took a leave of absence from CPS in order to work at the other school district.

During the course of the investigation, the teacher resigned from employment with CPS. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7205)

An OIG investigation revealed that a senior analyst assigned to a central office department improperly received more than $32,000.00 in salary after she had been laid off from her position with CPS. (7214)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a porter falsified CPS employment records when attempting to secure employment with CPS in that he utilized an invalid social security number on numerous CPS employment documents, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The porter was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6770)

An OIG investigation of a high school administration, including the principal and school business manager, revealed that:
o The principal and business manager failed to obtain Local School Council approval for a School Usage Permit for the use of the school’s auxiliary gym by an entertainment company for a fundraising event, in violation of the CPS Insider’s Guide to School Business and Internal Accounts (“Internal Accounts Manual”).

o The principal and school business manager failed to obtain Local School Council approval for a separate fundraising dance at the school, in violation of the CPS Internal Accounts Manual.

o The entertainment company, which promoted the fundraising dance in the school’s gym, failed to meet the insurance requirements of a School Usage Permit when its insurance broker failed to bind the policy with the insurance provider, in violation of the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. This became problematic when the school suffered almost $10,000.00 in damage as a result of the dance.

o Both the school administration and the entertainment company failed to pay City of Chicago and Cook County amusement taxes on potentially $4,000.00 collected during the dance that did not directly benefit the school’s students.

o The principal and school business manager allowed a fundraising dance to be conducted at the school past 10:30 p.m. on a Sunday, in violation of the curfew rules of the Municipal Code of Chicago.

o The principal and school business manager allowed a fundraising dance to be conducted in the school’s auxiliary gym which compromised the safe capacity of the school’s auxiliary gym.

As a result of the OIG investigation, the principal was issued a warning resolution and a 20-day suspension. The school business manager was issued a 10-day suspension. (6598)

➢ An OIG investigation revealed that a day-to-day substitute teacher, who had retired from her position as a high school teacher, retaliated against a clerk at the school to which the teacher was assigned because the clerk had filed a complaint with the OIG. Specifically, the teacher made derogatory remarks to the clerk and threw a bag containing a plastic rat on the clerk’s desk, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7483)

➢ The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher was arrested for false personation of a public officer, theft of lost or mislaid property, and various traffic offenses. In addition, the teacher falsified his CPS attendance records in that on at least ten occasions the teacher represented that he was working when in fact he was attending court while on CPS time. The teacher also utilized sick leave in an unauthorized manner, in that on at least six occasions the teacher utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick but attending court. The investigation also revealed that the teacher used school property without authorization, in that the teacher stored numerous personal vehicles on school property and utilized tools and parts to repair these vehicles. All of these actions were in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6239)
The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed that the teacher falsified official school documents in that she understated her income on free and reduced-price meal applications submitted on behalf of her two daughters for two school years which enabled the students to receive free or reduced-price meal benefits to which they were not entitled. The teacher also failed to obtain a School Usage Permit and requisite insurance to utilize the high school gymnasium for practices for her club sports team, in violation of the CPS Insider’s Guide to School Business and Internal Accounts. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (6707)

An OIG investigation revealed that a high school engineer forged the name of another engineer on numerous invoices regarding personal purchases that the offending engineer made on the school account at a local hardware store. During the course of the investigation, the offending engineer resigned from his position with CPS and was subsequently designated ineligible to be rehired. (7480)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school security officer leased the high school facility on numerous weekends without depositing the funds received from the leasing of the facility with the school treasurer and without following various requirements regarding the leasing of school property contained in the CPS Internal Accounts Manual. The OIG investigation further revealed that the school’s principal participated in or acquiesced in the scheme with the security officer to lease the high school facility on numerous weekends without depositing the funds received from the leasing of the facility with the school treasurer and without following various requirements regarding the leasing of school property. The school security officer was laid off from CPS during the course of the investigation and the principal was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7223)

The OIG conducted an investigation of two employees of a privatized custodial vendor which revealed that one of the custodians provided a social security number which was assigned to another individual when submitting to fingerprinting by CPS and the other custodian provided an invalid social security number when submitting to fingerprinting by CPS. Also, during the course of this investigation, the OIG met with representatives of the CPS Law, Purchasing and Human Resources Departments. Based on this meeting, it was determined that CPS will initiate a procedure regarding notifying vendors when CPS discovers that documentation regarding an employee of the vendor is suspected to be fraudulent at the time of fingerprinting. This procedure will apply to other vendors as well. (7251)

After receiving an allegation concerning the background of a miscellaneous employee performing security services at an elementary school, an OIG investigation revealed that, four years ago, the employee was indicted by a Cook County grand jury on twenty-six counts of official misconduct, two counts of battery, and four counts of attempt to obstruct justice based on an incident while he was employed by a previous employer. In addition, the employee plead guilty to one count of misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to serve an eighteen month term of probation and was
discharged from his position with the previous employer. The OIG recommended that CPS take appropriate disciplinary action against the employee. (7568)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school teacher fraudulently misrepresented that he was going to reside in a home he was purchasing to meet an eligibility requirement for obtaining financial assistance from the CPS funded Employer Assisted Housing Program. The OIG investigation revealed that the teacher never resided at the house but nevertheless received the $3,000 in financial assistance. (7235)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school teacher fraudulently misrepresented on an Illinois State Board of Education Application for Provisional Vocational Certificate that he had a pharmacist license when in fact that license had been revoked almost one year earlier, in violation of the School Code of Illinois and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher retired pending disciplinary action and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6896)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a special education classroom assistant assigned to a high school failed to properly dispose of Special Education Student Folders, by dumping ten boxes containing the student records in recycling carts in various public alleys, in violation of the CPS Maintenance and Retention of School Student Records policy and the CPS Discipline and Due Process Policy. Additionally, the classroom assistant made false, inaccurate, or deliberately incomplete statements during an official investigation, in that he made at least three statements to the OIG that were later directly contradicted, in violation of the CPS Discipline and Due Process Policy. Disciplinary action against the classroom assistant is pending. (8038)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school principal and a provisionally certificated substitute teacher who was also the varsity football coach at the high school. The OIG investigation revealed that the principal engaged in an act prohibited by federal statutes, in that he committed the offense of false declarations before a grand jury or court by making a false affirmation under penalty of perjury in a declaration submitted as part of a lawsuit. The OIG investigation also revealed that the substitute teacher made a false statement in an official investigation, in that during an interview with the OIG, the substitute teacher made a false statement concerning the date on which he typed a letter to the principal. Both the principal and substitute teacher were terminated from CPS employment and have been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7440)

**Residency**

To comply with the CPS Residency Policy, employees hired after November 20, 1996 must reside within the City of Chicago. The CPS Residency Policy mandates that employees, unless granted a waiver because they teach in an identified “special needs” area, must maintain a City of Chicago domicile defined as the one true, permanent home
to which whenever they are absent they have an intention of returning. The OIG has been delegated the responsibility of investigating allegations of non-residency and in fact, the OIG receives more complaints of employees violating the Residency Policy than any other rule violation. In FY 09, the 202 complaints of alleged residency violations received by the OIG totaled more than 16% of all the complaints received by the OIG. To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly, consistently and equitably; to reduce animosity between those employees who abide by the residency requirement and those who do not, thereby enhancing employee production; and, to set the tone that CPS rules and policies must be adhered to, the OIG delegates resources to investigate alleged violations of the Residency Policy.

The Residency Policy reflects that employees who intentionally submit a false residential address to avoid the requirements of the policy have engaged in irremediable conduct punishable by discharge. In FY 09, the OIG issued the following reports on employees who intentionally submitted false residential addresses reflecting that they lived in the City of Chicago when in fact they did not. Based on an OIG recommendation, in each case the employees resigned from CPS employment, were terminated or were suspended without pay pending a hearing and most were designated as ineligible to be rehired.

- A school operations manager was found to be residing in Flossmoor, IL. This employee was also involved in falsifying attendance records and that facet of the investigation is reported in the appropriate section of this report. The school operations manager was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (4016)

- An investigation revealed that a teacher resided in Glenwood, IL. This teacher was also investigated for ethics violations for failure to report secondary employment and that facet of the investigation is reported in the appropriate section of this report. The teacher resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6627)

- A school clerk assistant lived in Lincolnwood, IL, in violation of the Residency Policy. Discipline against the school clerk assistant is pending. (6218)

- An elementary school teacher was found to be residing in Deerfield, IL. The teacher resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6219)

- An elementary school teacher was found to be residing in Evanston, IL. A co-worker was also involved in the residency scheme, having allowed the teacher to use her city address. The co-schemer also made false statements to the OIG during its investigation. The teacher was terminated and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. The co-schemer received a 16 day suspension. (6221)

- An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher assistant resided in Lincolnwood, IL. The teacher assistant resigned from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (6590)
A high school teacher was found to be residing in Country Club Hills, IL. The teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6674)

A high school principal was found to be residing in Oak Park, IL. The principal subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6745)

A school engineer resided in Westchester, IL., in violation of the Residency Policy. Disciplinary action against the engineer is pending. (6760)

An elementary school principal was found to be residing in Romeoville, IL. The principal subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6798)

An elementary school teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6914)

An investigation revealed that a high school teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The investigation also revealed that the teacher assisted a co-worker in falsifying the co-worker’s attendance records, as reported above. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (7637)

Employees who do not intentionally provide a false residential address to avoid the residency requirement are allowed to remediate their misconduct by coming into compliance with the residency requirement. The following OIG investigations dealt with employees who did not provide a false residential address.

An elementary school principal was found to be residing in Crete, IL. This principal, as reported above, was also involved in making unnecessary purchases of equipment for the school. The principal left CPS employment before the completion of the OIG investigation and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7095)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Maywood, IL. The assistant principal subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6962)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Phoenix, IL. Following the OIG investigation, the assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6964)

A high school assistant principal resided in Park Ridge, IL. The assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6966)

A high school principal resided in Oak Park, IL. The principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6969)
An elementary school assistant principal resided in South Holland, IL. The assistant principal came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6970)

A high school assistant principal resided in Evanston, IL. The assistant principal was issued a written reprimand and came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6972)

An elementary school teacher resided in Park Forest, IL. The teacher was issued a warning resolution and came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7092)

A database analyst resided in Crete, IL. The database analyst came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7092)

An engineer resided in Calumet City, IL. The engineer was issued a written reprimand and was suspended. (7101)

A central office employee resided in Glenwood, IL. The employee subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (7103)

A high school student advocate resided in Maywood, IL. The student advocate was subsequently laid off from CPS employment. (7364)

A high school teacher resided in Orland Park, IL. The teacher was subsequently issued a waiver from the residency requirement. (6941)

**Residency / Tuition Fraud**

The Office of the Inspector General has been delegated the responsibility of conducting investigations into allegations that various Chicago Public School students reside outside the City of Chicago, a violation of the Illinois School Code. In FY 09, five of these investigations conducted by the OIG found that CPS employees falsified their children’s residential address, as well as their own residential address on employment records with CPS, and enrolled their children in CPS despite residing in the suburbs. In addition to being subject to discipline for residing in the suburbs, the employees are also liable for the payment of non-resident tuition for enrolling their children in CPS while residing in the suburbs. These investigations are detailed below.

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school clerk resided in Alsip, IL. The investigation revealed that three of the school clerk’s children attended CPS while residing in Alsip, thereby causing the school clerk to be liable for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $61,173.17. The school clerk was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired and an action to recover the non-resident tuition is pending. (4543)

An elementary school cook resided in Evergreen Park, IL. and sent her granddaughter, for whom she was the guardian, to a CPS elementary school for a
number of years. The cook is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $56,345.07. The cook was terminated and designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (5757)

- An elementary school clerk resided in Oak Forest, while her daughter attended a CPS high school. The school clerk is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $17,619.38. The school clerk resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (5963)

- An elementary school teacher resided in Franklin Park, IL while enrolling three of her children in various CPS schools, including the school where she worked. The teacher is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $100,237.38. The teacher resigned from CPS employment. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (6220)

- An elementary school teacher resided in Lincolnwood, IL and sent her three children to CPS schools, including the school where she worked. The teacher is responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $88,687.59. The teacher resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (6589)

- Two children of a CPS employee attended a CPS elementary school despite residing in South Holland, IL, and their mother, a high school teacher, is liable for non-resident tuition in the amount of $35,238.76. CPS is attempting to recover the non-resident tuition owed. (6709)

**Criminal Conduct**

- An elementary school teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of aggravated battery to a police officer after spitting in the face of a police officer. The teacher plead guilty to a charge of misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to three years of probation. The teacher’s principal was notified of the incident and no discipline was imposed. (6493)

- The OIG received notification that a high school lunchroom employee was arrested and charged with the offenses of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery after stabbing a woman in the chest. The employee plead guilty to the charge of aggravated battery and was sentenced to serve a term of four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The employee was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6301)

- An elementary school custodial worker was arrested and charged with the felony offense of aggravated driving under the influence after police observed him driving drunk with children in his vehicle. The custodial worker plead guilty to the charge of aggravated driving under the influence and was sentenced to 18 months of probation.
The custodial worker subsequently retired from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6902)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a substitute teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of aggravated assault to a police officer. The substitute teacher plead guilty to a charge of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 16 days in the Cook County Department of Corrections. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment. (7492)

- An elementary school teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of theft after fraudulently obtaining $2000 after using another person’s debit card. The teacher plead guilty and was sentenced to 13 months of court supervision. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher utilized sick time to attend court on two separate days, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Disciplinary action against the teacher is pending. (7273)

- An elementary school guidance counselor assistant was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The charges were subsequently dismissed, however, during an interview with the OIG, the guidance counselor assistant admitted to possessing PCP when she was arrested. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the guidance counselor assistant utilized sick time for two days that she was actually in custody and on one day that she attended court, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The guidance counselor was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7312)

- Two elementary school teachers were each issued citations for possession of marijuana on state land in Wisconsin. One of the teachers was also issued a citation for possession of drug paraphernalia. One teacher paid a $249.00 fine after being issued the citation for possessing 5.66 grams of marijuana. The other teacher paid fines of $249.00 and $300.00 after being issued citations for possessing 8.5 grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Disciplinary action against the teachers is pending. (7711)

- A high school teacher was arrested and charged with the offenses of possession of cannabis and domestic battery. The teacher plead guilty to the domestic battery charge and was sentenced to 18 months of court supervision. The possession of marijuana charge was dismissed. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher utilized sick time for twelve days that he was actually in custody in Cook County jail, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7586)

- A substitute teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of cannabis. The charges against the substitute teacher were dismissed. However, the OIG investigation revealed that the substitute teacher was arrested on three previous
occasions and charged with possession of cannabis following each arrest. Following each arrest, the charges against the substitute teacher were dismissed. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment. (7618)

- An elementary school custodial worker was arrested for the offense of possession of cannabis. The criminal charges were dismissed, however, during an interview with the OIG, the custodial worker admitted that on the day he was arrested, he purchased cannabis from his granddaughter, smoked cannabis while at his granddaughter’s house, and possessed cannabis in his vehicle at the time he was arrested by the Chicago Police Department. The custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7127)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a school security aide assigned to a high school. The OIG investigation revealed that the security aide was convicted of the felony offense of delivery of a controlled substance, which, under the School Code of Illinois, precludes his employment with CPS. The OIG investigation also revealed that the security aide failed to notify CPS of his felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance within ten days of the conviction, in violation of Board Rule 4-4c. The security aide resigned from CPS employment and was designated ineligible to be rehired. (7153)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a school security officer was arrested and charged with the felony offense of criminal sexual assault of a fifteen year old male. The school security officer was terminated from CPS employment and designated as ineligible to be rehired. The school security officer subsequently plead guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to six months in jail and two years of probation. (6893)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a high school porter was convicted of the felony offense of delivery of a controlled substance, which, under the School Code of Illinois, precludes her employment with CPS and is in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the porter failed to notify CPS of her felony conviction of delivery of a controlled substance within ten days of the conviction, in violation of Board Rules. The OIG investigation further revealed that the porter used sick leave in an unauthorized manner in that she used sick days on seven occasions when she was attending court regarding her arrest for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The porter was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7131)

- An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school security aide plead guilty to the criminal offense of stealing funds of the United States Postal Service, in violation of 18 United States Code 641. The school security aide was sentenced to three years of probation, four months of home confinement and ordered to pay nearly $14,000 in restitution. In addition, during an interview with the OIG, the security aide
admitted that he utilized two United States Postal Service issued gasoline credit cards, which he obtained from his mother who was a United States Postal Service employee, to purchase gas for his personal vehicles and to allow others to purchase gas for their personal vehicles in exchange for cash payments to him, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation further revealed that the security aide, on at least two occasions, utilized sick time when in fact he was not sick, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The security aide was terminated from CPS employment and designated ineligible to be rehired. (7271)

- The OIG learned that an elementary school engineer was arrested after he was identified by two former co-workers as the individual who left a voice mail message at an elementary school stating that he was going to blow up the school. The criminal charges against the engineer were subsequently dismissed. No disciplinary action was taken against the engineer. (7645)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an hourly employee assigned to a high school, who had previously taught at the high school, was accused of sexually assaulting family members. The OIG also learned that after being accused of assaulting family members, the employee barricaded himself in the garage of his residence and threatened suicide. The employee was subsequently arrested for that offense and charged with reckless conduct. Those criminal charges were dismissed. During the course of the investigation, the employee had stopped working at the high school and following the investigation was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7747)

**On-Duty Criminal Conduct**

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school custodial worker which revealed the following:
  - The custodial worker was arrested and charged with the offense of possession of a controlled substance and that charge was dismissed.
  - During an interview with the OIG, the custodial worker stated that he sometimes smokes marijuana for recreational purposes, that he used heroin the day before he was arrested, and that he uses heroin three or four times a week.
  - On the day he was arrested, the custodial worker left his duty assignment without permission, while on duty, and was subsequently arrested.
  - The next day he utilized a sick day when in fact he was not sick but was in custody regarding his arrest.

Following the OIG investigation, the custodial worker was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (7377)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school lunchroom attendant was arrested and subsequently charged with the offenses of
identity theft and misuse of a credit card after she, while on duty at the elementary school, stole the debit card of a co-worker and utilized the card at a local store to purchase a pack of cigarettes. The lunchroom assistant plead guilty to the criminal charge and was sentenced to four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The OIG also learned during the course of the investigation that, in a previous unrelated case, the lunchroom attendant plead guilty to the offense of aggravated identity theft and was sentenced to serve a four year term of probation. Following that conviction, the lunchroom attendant failed to notify the CPS Chief Executive Officer within five days of her conviction for the felony offense of aggravated identity theft, in violation of Board Rules. The lunchroom attendant was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. (7731)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school porter and a custodial worker removed crates of milk from the lunchroom at the school without the authorization of the lunchroom manager. The porter and custodial worker received school based discipline. (7482)