Office of the Inspector General
Annual Report
July 1, 2007 – June 30, 2008

James M. Sullivan
Inspector General

Prepared pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e)
December 1, 2008

This Annual Report is being provided to the Chicago Board of Education and the Illinois General Assembly pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, specifically 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e).

The School Code authorizes the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") for the Chicago Board of Education to conduct investigations into allegations of or incidents of waste, fraud, and financial mismanagement in public education within the jurisdiction of the Board. The OIG has also been charged with the responsibility of investigating allegations of various categories of employee misconduct.

This Annual Report is a summary of reports and investigations for Fiscal Year 2008, the period between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008. Other significant accomplishments that occurred in FY 2008 are also summarized.

The mission of the Office of the Inspector General is to ensure integrity in the operations of the Chicago Public Schools ("CPS") by conducting meaningful, accurate and thorough investigations into allegations of waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG also reviews CPS systems, practices and procedures to determine their efficacy in preventing waste, fraud and financial mismanagement.

The OIG would like to thank the Chicago Board of Education and CPS administration for continued cooperation and support and its usually rapid response to reports and recommendations issued by the OIG.

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BUDGET

During Fiscal Year 2008, the Office of the Inspector General continued to perform its statutorily mandated function, despite continued budget and staffing constraints. In FY 2008, the OIG was allocated $1.8 million and was staffed with 17 full-time employees. Compared to oversight offices with similar responsibilities, the OIG is extremely under-funded and under-staffed. Despite these shortcomings, the OIG continues to conduct accurate, thorough and meaningful investigations resulting in increased integrity in CPS operations.

TRAINING

Many employees of the OIG are members of the Association of Inspectors General, a national organization of state, local and federal inspectors general and their staffs. The AIG offers training seminars and certification institutes for members as well as networking opportunities. Currently, five OIG employees have received the designation of Certified Inspector General after undergoing training by the AIG. Participation in the AIG also allows the OIG to be trained in best practices in the performance of the Inspector General function. Locally, the OIG collaborates with IG offices from other state and local agencies to train all staff in a variety of investigation and audit related areas.

INVESTIGATION STANDARDS

The OIG conducts its investigations in accordance with the Principles and Standards For Offices Of Inspector General, generally accepted principles, quality standards and best practices applicable to federal, state and local offices of inspectors general. In addition, the OIG, at all times, exercises due professional care in conducting its investigations and issuing its reports and recommendations.

FISCAL YEAR 2008 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

In FY 08, the OIG received 1012 complaints alleging misconduct, waste, fraud and financial mismanagement within the Chicago Public School system. This total represents the largest number of complaints received in a reporting year by the OIG. These complaints included allegations of misconduct by CPS employees or vendors and allegations of students residing outside the City of Chicago and attending CPS. As illustrated below, the OIG continues to receive complaints and initiate investigations on an increasing number of allegations each year.
A detailed breakdown of the type of complaints received by the OIG in FY 08 is illustrated below. In FY 08, the OIG received 24 complaints alleging contractor misconduct, 69 complaints alleging that students who attend CPS reside outside the City of Chicago, and 919 allegations of various types of employee misconduct. It should be noted that 79 of the complaints identified as “ethics violations” concerned allegations of CPS Ethics Policy violations involving employees who also had a relationship to a CPS vendor.
FY 2008 UPDATES TO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INVESTIGATIONS

Federal Criminal Convictions

In its FY 06 Annual Report, the OIG reported that a CPS contractor actually controlled a company that purported to be a certified minority business enterprise. The investigation determined that the majority-owned contractor controlled the MBE company and its work on a CPS sheltered market contract. In essence, the investigation revealed that employees of the majority-owned company prepared the MBE’s bid documents, handled invoicing for the MBE and had excessive control of the MBE’s business bank account, including transferring funds in and out of the MBE’s account. Following the OIG investigation, CPS debarred the majority-owned company, the MBE and another company involved in the contracting scam. The matter was referred to law enforcement and the majority-owned company owner and the MBE owner were both charged with the federal offense of mail fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In FY 08, both the owner of the majority-owned company and the MBE owner plead guilty to mail fraud for their roles in the minority contracting scam. Both are awaiting sentencing. (C294)

Conviction for Theft

In its FY 06 Annual Report, the OIG reported on an investigation which revealed that during a five-year period, a CPS employee wrote 319 school checks to herself. The checks, totaling $456,554.67, were cashed by the employee or deposited into her personal bank account. The employee resigned during the course of the investigation and the matter was subsequently referred for criminal prosecution. In FY 07, the employee plead guilty in criminal court and began paying restitution. In FY 08, the former employee was sentenced to four years in prison after having paid $78,000 in restitution to CPS. (4579)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 INVESTIGATIONS

In FY 08, the OIG issued 129 reports documenting investigations of alleged waste, fraud, financial mismanagement and employee misconduct. The OIG conducted numerous other investigations of allegations that did not reveal evidence of wrongdoing. Pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1(e), the following are summaries of the OIG investigations for which reports were submitted in FY 08.
Payroll Fraud Scheme

The OIG conducted an investigation of a payroll fraud scheme involving nine CPS employees. The OIG investigation revealed that two employees assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused seven other employees to receive a total of at least $141,285.64 in CPS funds to which they were not entitled. Specifically, the OIG investigation revealed that a voucher coordinator assigned to the CPS Payroll Department fraudulently caused at least $120,129.74 in payroll checks to be issued to a high school teacher, an elementary school teacher, a financial specialist, and two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the voucher coordinator received kickbacks from the CPS employees in exchange for causing the fraudulent payroll checks to be issued in their names. The OIG investigation also revealed that the high school teacher received money which was subsequently given to the voucher coordinator as a kickback from the school clerk in exchange for payroll checks being issued in the school clerk’s name for CPS funds to which the clerk was not entitled.

The OIG investigation additionally revealed that a payroll adjustment clerk fraudulently caused at least $21,155.90 in payroll checks to be issued to two school clerks to which they were not entitled. The OIG investigation further revealed that the payroll adjustment clerk received kickbacks from the school clerks in exchange for causing payroll checks to be issued in their names for CPS funds to which they were not entitled.

The OIG investigation further revealed that a control built into the payroll system that could have traced the entries that created the bogus paychecks was not activated. This audit function would have attached a user name, time and date to the entries that generated the $141,285.64 in fraudulent pay. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that had the audit function been activated, it is likely that the Payroll Department employees would not have made the fraudulent entries knowing that the system was capable of detecting the user making the entries to the system at that level.

During the course of the investigation, the matter was referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office for a criminal investigation. As a result of the joint investigation between the OIG and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, nine CPS employees were indicted by a Cook County Circuit Court grand jury. The two payroll department employees were charged with being the organizers of a continuing financial crimes enterprise, a Class X felony, as well as numerous other charges. The seven employees who received bogus checks were charged with various counts of theft and theft of school and government property. The criminal charges against the nine are pending in criminal court. Seven of the employees involved in the scheme have been terminated or resigned from CPS employment. Disciplinary action is pending against the other two employees. (6610)
Elementary School Principal’s Theft and Other Misconduct

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school principal following allegations of financial impropriety and ethics violations. During the course of the investigation, the OIG also investigated allegations of misconduct involving the principal’s daughters, who were CPS teachers at another elementary school. As a result of the investigation, the OIG found that the principal stole more than $22,000 of school funds by writing school internal account checks to herself; stole more than $4,800 of school funds by obtaining reimbursements for the purchase of non-school related items; and, stole more than $2,900 from her school by purchasing items used for the personal benefit of her daughters. The investigation also revealed that the principal forged the signature of a clerk on at least 18 school internal account checks. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the principal misappropriated more than $3,300 in school funds by falsifying attendance records for her daughters reflecting that they worked more hours than they actually did when her daughters purportedly worked during a summer at the principal’s school.

The OIG investigation also revealed that the principal misappropriated additional funds including spending $1,559.95 of school funds to purchase three 32-inch televisions that could not be located during the investigation and using her school’s funds to benefit her daughter’s students at another elementary school. Further, the OIG investigation revealed that the principal’s personal trainer received $29,000 from the elementary school during a four-month period to provide a health and wellness program at the school. The OIG uncovered evidence that the trainer also received money from a school partner to provide the same program at the school and, in fact, the trainer submitted invoices to CPS and the school partner with overlapping time on 27 different days for a total of 58.5 overlapping hours. This resulted in the trainer being paid $5,850 from CPS and $2,340 from the partner for the same time worked and the same services provided.

During the course of the OIG investigation, the principal was removed from the elementary school and began paying CPS restitution. The principal was subsequently terminated from CPS employment and has been designated ineligible to be rehired. The OIG also referred the results of the investigation to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office for prosecution. The principal was subsequently charged with theft, forgery and official misconduct. The principal plead guilty to a theft charge and was sentenced to two years probation and 832 hours of community service. The principal also paid $35,000 in restitution to CPS. Disciplinary action against the principal’s daughters is pending. (5316, 5318, 5452)
Grade Changing and Altering Student Transcripts

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that students at a CPS high school were allowed to graduate even though the students had failed a class. The subsequent OIG investigation revealed the following.

  * Four high school student athletes received a D in a class in the final semester of their senior year. High school staff, or a person with access to the Student Information system at the high school, subsequently changed the D's to C's after graduation and then back to D's one month later. None of the grade changes were supported by any documentation. During the time that the grades were reflected as C's, final transcripts were sent by high school staff to the colleges to which these four students sought admission. The investigation revealed that each of the colleges received transcripts for the student athletes that fraudulently misrepresented that the students received a C, when in fact the grade given was a D.

  * High school staff lost the original permanent records or CPS Envelopes For Student’s Records (HI 115A) for three of the above mentioned student athletes, as well as their fellow students in five divisions of students, and these records were still missing and could not be located during the course of the OIG investigation.

  * A student athlete received a D in a class that was subsequently changed almost one year later to an A without any documented support.

  * A student athlete graduated despite not fulfilling the necessary graduation requirements in a core area to graduate.

  * A student received F’s in two classes that were subsequently changed to C's without any documented support and without the knowledge of the teacher.

  * A student graduated despite not completing work as a purported independent study student until after graduation.

  * A student graduated before a grade of C in a class was added to the student’s transcript. The OIG investigation further revealed that the student was not enrolled in the class and the OIG was not able to identify any teacher who taught the student as a purported independent study student.

  * At least three other students graduated in June 2007 despite not fulfilling CPS credit requirements for graduation.

Based on its investigation, the OIG recommended that (1) CPS administration take the appropriate disciplinary action against staff members; (2) that CPS administration enact sufficient controls to prevent school staff from fraudulently changing student grades; and, (3) that CPS routinely audit senior transcripts to ensure that prospective CPS graduates are meeting graduation requirements.
It should be noted that this is the second investigation undertaken by the OIG into allegations that high school students’ grades were improperly changed and students were allowed to graduate without meeting graduation requirements. Based on these investigations, it has become obvious that CPS needs to establish controls to ensure the integrity of CPS grades, transcripts, and diplomas. At a minimum, any controls should include a routine audit of transcripts and prospective graduates’ records to enforce and emphasize management’s commitment to graduating students well-prepared for post-secondary education, as well as to ensure that post-secondary institutions can rely on the accuracy of CPS transcripts. (6012)

**Fraudulent Enrollment at a CPS Controlled Enrollment Elementary School**

- Following an allegation that staff at an elementary school falsified the addresses of their children to allow their children to attend the controlled enrollment school, the OIG conducted numerous investigations. These investigations revealed numerous instances in which the controlled enrollment elementary school had enrolled students despite the fact that the students resided outside the school’s attendance area, in violation of the CPS Controlled Enrollment Policy. The OIG investigation revealed that:

  - School employees and relatives of school employees falsified their children’s residential address to reflect that their children resided in the school’s attendance area.
  - Children of school employees and relatives of school employees were allowed to attend the school despite residing outside the school’s attendance area.
  - At least 66 other students were allowed to attend the school despite residing outside the school’s attendance area.
  - At least 27, and perhaps as many as 36, students residing in the school’s attendance area could not enroll in the school and were involuntarily transferred to other schools, costing CPS as much as $252,000 per year to bus these students to other schools.
  - CPS failed to conduct any formal annual evaluation of the controlled enrollment status of the school despite having knowledge that, in the past seven school years, a significant number of students who resided outside the school’s attendance area attended the school.
  - The OIG also found that it appeared, based on data obtained during the course of the OIG investigation, that the school’s enrollment practices had a disproportionate impact on African-American students who resided within the school’s attendance area. CPS data reflects that as of 2007, 92.9% of the students attending the school were Hispanic, 6% of the students attending the school were African-American, and .2% of the students attending the school were white. Of the sixty-nine students who were allowed to attend the school despite residing outside the attendance area,
area, one (1.4%) was African-American. Of the thirty-six students who were involuntarily transferred from the controlled enrollment school to another school, eighteen (50%) were African-American. Further, based solely on data from the CPS Bureau of Student Transportation Services, of the twenty-seven students who were involuntarily transferred from the controlled enrollment school to another school, twelve (44%) were African-American.

Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended that:

- CPS enact appropriate disciplinary action against the school employees who falsified their children’s addresses.
- A former employee who falsified her child’s address be designated as ineligible to be rehired.
- CPS analyze the records of the students who attended the controlled enrollment school based on falsified addresses in order to determine the appropriate schools in which they should be enrolled and to which they should be transferred.
- CPS institute a more formal process to review and evaluate whether any CPS school, and the school investigated, should remain on controlled enrollment, using at the very least, statistics maintained by and readily available to the CPS Office of School Demographics and Planning.

As of the preparing of this report, dismissal charges have been filed against the school employees who falsified their children’s addresses to allow them to be enrolled in the controlled enrollment school. (6387-6394)

**Stringing Purchases to Avoid Internal Controls**

In FY 08, the OIG conducted three investigations into purchasing irregularities in a central office department. In essence, these investigations revealed that staff and vendors were structuring purchases to avoid statutory bidding requirements and internal CPS rules and policies.

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that purchases of equipment by a central office department were orchestrated to circumvent Illinois law and Chicago Board of Education Rules and Policies concerning competitive bidding and Board approval of purchases. Specifically, a vendor orchestrated a scheme to reflect that the purchases of millions of dollars of equipment by CPS were purportedly made from ten separate vendors when in fact the purchases were made from the same vendor. The investigation further revealed that this scheme was allowed to take place due to the complicity of CPS staff. In summary, since FY 04, more than $2.5 million of purchases have been made from the vendor and co-scheming companies. These purchases of biddable items, including purchases of various pieces of machinery and related add-ons, were not subjected to competitive bidding or
Board approval. The purchases were also not reviewed for compliance with CPS goals concerning minority-owned or women-owned business participation. In fact, the investigation revealed that the bad vendor created three other vendors, including his sister, a friend and another person, for the purpose of purporting to sell equipment to CPS. The bad vendor also utilized six other vendors to sell equipment by simply using the vendors’ name and CPS vendor number on the purchases when in fact those purported suppliers did not perform any function in the transaction other than to send the bad vendor the purchase orders and checks received from CPS in exchange for 3% of the purchase price.

The scheme was further perpetuated by a lack of adherence to Illinois purchasing law by CPS staff. The OIG learned, during the course of this and other investigations, that CPS may recognize each CPS school as a distinct unit for procurement purposes. The OIG contends, and has attempted to persuade CPS administration, that this interpretation has no basis in Illinois law.

The purchases by CPS from the bad vendor and co-scheming companies circumvented competitive bidding requirements and Board approval and amounted to stringing, an act prohibited by the Criminal Code of Illinois and Board Rules. In essence, the purchases from the bad vendor and co-scheming companies, occurred in three different scenarios with each scenario amounting to an act of stringing. First, biddable items valued at less than $10,000.00 each were purchased by CPS from the bad vendor for multiple schools, exceeding a total cost of more than $10,000.00. For example, the same machine, valued at $9,999.00, was purchased by CPS at the same time for five different schools, without competitive bidding or Board approval. Second, biddable items were purchased by CPS for multiple schools utilizing invoices of another supplier to mask the fact that the bad vendor was the actual vendor engaged in the transaction. For example, six machines were purchased by CPS for six different schools with another supplier as the purported vendor and the purchase was masked as such because the bad vendor had sold equipment to the schools and would have been restricted by procurement rules from exceeding $10,000.00 to the unit in one year. Third, CPS purchased biddable items valued at more than $10,000.00 and the purchase was divided up and purportedly sold by different suppliers, each making a sale of part of the item with a value less than $10,000.00. For example, on the same day, CPS purchased two machines, in three parts, with each part costing $9,950.00, from the bad vendor and two other purported suppliers, all vendors whose sales to CPS were controlled by the bad vendor.

Following its investigation, the OIG pointed out that the actions uncovered during the course of the investigation pose other serious issues for CPS. By not adhering to local procurement rules, CPS risks losing the substantial grant funds that were utilized to fund the improper purchasing activity. In addition,
as stated above, the purchases also circumvented CPS goals for minority and women owned business participation. Further, the OIG questioned the necessity of some of the purchases and the ability of school-based staff to utilize the equipment. During the course of the investigation, the OIG learned that three years after a machine was purchased for a school it sat unused and unwrapped. Based on this and other investigations, the OIG recommended that CPS enact more specific, enforceable and manageable procurement rules and policies that are consistent with Illinois law. Further, the OIG recommended that the bad vendor and the other purported suppliers who were complicit in the purchasing scheme be debarred by CPS. The OIG also referred its investigation to law enforcement for review for possible prosecution. Disciplinary action against the vendors is pending. (C349)

In another investigation involving the same department, the OIG examined the purchases of materials and supplies for use at various schools. The investigation revealed that the purchase of $185,722.88 of materials was not competitively bid and, as such, the purchase violated Illinois law and Chicago Board of Education Rules and Policies. The investigation also revealed that the contemporaneous purchase of $16,296.00 of materials and supplies from a different vendor was also not competitively bid and, as such, violated Illinois law and Board Rules and Policies. The OIG investigation revealed that a CPS manager orchestrated the purchase of more than $200,000.00 of materials and supplies from two vendors. The purchase of $185,722.88 of materials and supplies from the first vendor was orchestrated to reflect that 19 separate purchases were being made for 16 different schools, with each purchase being less than $10,000.00, the statutory threshold for competitive bidding and Board approval. In addition, to avoid exceeding the $10,000.00 threshold at some of the schools, $16,296.00 of purchases were made from the second vendor for five of the same schools. These purchases were orchestrated by central office staff in that every function of the purchase was performed by central office staff. Specifically, products were identified for purchase for schools, grant funds to cover the purchase price were transferred to school budget lines, purchase orders were requisitioned and products were receipted, all by central office staff with virtually no participation by school based staff. As such, the purchase of materials and supplies from both the vendors should have been subject to competitive bidding and Board approval. The OIG investigation also indicated that the circumvention of the bidding requirements may also subject staff to the criminal charge of stringing, defined as “knowingly structuring a contract or job order to avoid the contract or job order being subject to competitive bidding requirements.”

Again, following this investigation, the OIG recommended that CPS enact more specific, enforceable and manageable procurement rules and policies that are consistent with Illinois law. (6168)
In a third stringing investigation, the OIG reviewed the purchase of 30 cappuccino / espresso machines for use in a high school program. The investigation revealed that the purchase of $67,928.10 of these machines was not competitively bid and as such the purchase violated Illinois law and Chicago Board of Education Rules and Policies. The OIG investigation revealed that a CPS manager orchestrated the purchase of the cappuccino / espresso machines to reflect that separate purchases were being made by 21 different schools, with each purchase being less than $10,000.00, the statutory threshold for competitive bidding and Board approval. These purchases were orchestrated by CPS central office staff in that every function of the purchase was performed by central office staff. Specifically, the cappuccino / espresso machines were identified for purchase for schools, funds to cover the purchase price were transferred to school budget lines, purchase orders were requisitioned and products were receipted, all by central office staff with virtually no participation by school-based staff. Most of the school-based staff interviewed by the OIG did not even know they were to receive the cappuccino / espresso machines prior to the machines being delivered to the schools. As such, the purchase of the machines should have been subjected to competitive bidding and Board approval. The circumvention of the bidding requirements may also subject CPS staff to the criminal charge of stringing, defined as “knowingly structuring a contract or job order to avoid the contract or job order being subject to competitive bidding requirements.”

The actions uncovered during the course of the OIG investigation pose other serious issues for CPS. By not adhering to local purchasing rules, CPS risks losing the substantial grant funds that were utilized to fund the improper purchasing activity. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that by not subjecting the purchase of the cappuccino / espresso machines to competitive bidding, CPS overpaid for the items, perhaps by as much as $12,000.00 or 18%. The OIG investigation further revealed that despite purchasing the cappuccino / espresso machines for implementation into a school program, five months after the purchase and delivery of the items to the schools, 22 of the machines were still in their original boxes or remained wrapped in their original packaging; one machine was missing; three machines, at two schools, had been used, but not in the program they were purchased for; and, staff at two schools were still being trained how to use the machines.

Once again, based on the OIG investigation in this matter, and the two investigations mentioned above, the OIG recommended that CPS enact more specific, enforceable and manageable procurement rules and policies that are consistent with Illinois law. Further, the OIG recommended that, if warranted, discipline be enacted against CPS staff members responsible for the stringing of purchases to avoid the requirements of competitive bidding and Board approval. (6185)
Failure to Cooperate with the OIG

In FY 07, a Board Rule was proposed and passed by the Chicago Board of Education that codifies current case law and further warns employees of their specific duties regarding administrative investigations conducted by the OIG. Board Rule 4-4m obligates all CPS employees to cooperate with the OIG during its investigations. Specifically, all employees interviewed by the OIG who are advised of “Administrative Rights” may not refuse to answer questions based upon the assertion of that employee’s privilege against self-incrimination. Any employee who refuses to answer questions during an interview with the OIG after receiving a notice of administrative rights shall be considered flagrantly insubordinate and to have grossly disrupted the educational process within the meaning of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Any employee who refuses to answer questions posed by the OIG, after receipt of a notice of administrative rights, shall be subject to dismissal from employment.

In FY 08, the OIG conducted two investigations in which CPS employees failed to cooperate with the OIG.

- In one investigation, after being given administrative rights, an elementary school teacher refused to answer questions by investigators from the OIG regarding certain details of the incident surrounding her arrest out-of-state for trafficking in drugs and related offenses. This was the second interview in which the teacher failed to cooperate with the OIG after being properly warned to do so. Based on the failure to cooperate, the OIG recommended that the teacher be terminated from CPS employment. The teacher subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6006)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher following the teacher’s arrest for the offenses of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and possession of cannabis. During an interview with the OIG, after being properly warned of administrative rights, the teacher refused to answer questions by OIG investigators regarding certain details surrounding the arrest. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher utilized sick leave in an unauthorized manner, in that the teacher utilized sick time to attend court regarding his arrest, when in fact the teacher was not sick, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. Following this investigation, the teacher was issued a warning resolution. It should be noted as part of a continuing investigation into the teacher’s arrest for possession of a controlled substance, the teacher was again interviewed by the OIG in FY 09 and again failed to cooperate. Further disciplinary action is pending against the teacher. (6617)
**Ethics Violations**

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a central office director forwarded a family member's resume to CPS vendors inquiring whether the vendors or any other vendors had an employment opportunity for the family member. The investigation further revealed that the director attempted to use his CPS position to assist the family member in securing employment with vendors over whom the director exercised contract management authority in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The investigation also revealed that the director accepted gifts from a vendor that exceeded a cumulative value of $100.00 during a calendar year in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. Following the OIG investigation, the director received a five-day suspension. (5411)

- An investigation of an elementary school principal revealed that the principal engaged in contract management authority over purchases of educational materials from a company owned by the principal's sibling in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. Following the OIG investigation, the principal was issued a warning resolution. (5649)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a teacher assigned to a central office department had a direct economic interest in a CPS vendor in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher obtained and accepted secondary employment with the vendor without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer in violation of the Code of Ethics of the Board of Education. The teacher subsequently retired from CPS employment. (6201)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a senior professional assigned to a central office department exercised contract management authority regarding Board business with an educational institution with which he had a business relationship, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. Based on this employee’s role in the violation of State of Illinois and CPS competitive bidding requirements regarding CPS procurement activities mentioned previously in this report, the employee was terminated from employment with CPS and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6694)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a central office department analyst had a business relationship with the owner of a company that was a subcontractor on a CPS contract on which the analyst exercised contract management authority. Specifically, the investigation found that the analyst violated the CPS Code of Ethics by engaging in a business relationship with the subcontractor wherein the analyst was paid $3,000 for providing consulting services on behalf of the subcontractor. In addition, the
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OIG investigation revealed that the analyst violated the Code of Ethics based on the fact that his son obtained a job with the subcontractor and was paid by the subcontractor while the analyst exercised contract management authority over the subcontractor. Finally, the OIG investigation revealed that the subcontractor engaged in conduct indicating a lack of business integrity as prohibited by the CPS Debarment Policy by utilizing and paying the analyst and an employee of the general contractor to perform work for the subcontractor. Following the OIG investigation, the analyst resigned pending disciplinary action and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6170)

- The OIG received a referral from auditors who review CPS financial records and internal controls. The auditors noted in their review of CPS financial controls that there were a number of matches when a sample of CPS employee telephone numbers was compared to vendor telephone numbers. The referral suggested a review of those matches to ensure that any vendor/employee relationships did not create a conflict of interest. The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that of the 79 employee/vendor telephone number matches, 38 matches did not pose a current conflict, 39 matches created a potential conflict and two matches created a current conflict and further action was required. For the 39 matches that created a potential conflict, the OIG recommended that the vendor numbers of those vendors be deactivated which would not allow the vendors to be paid by CPS through the purchase order system, thus eliminating the potential conflict. For the two matches that created a current conflict of interest, the OIG recommended that CPS take the appropriate disciplinary action against the vendors and/or employees. In one instance, a school clerk had a direct economic interest in an organization that had a contract with CPS concerning the use of property at the school where the school clerk worked. Based on this and another investigation forwarded by the OIG, the school clerk resigned from CPS employment in lieu of disciplinary action. The school clerk has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. In another instance, the husband of an elementary school teacher was the president of a company that performed work for CPS. This vendor has not received any recent payments from CPS. (6408-6487)

**Misappropriation of Funds**

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school principal engaged in conduct in violation of the CPS Internal Accounts guidelines. The investigation showed that the principal was issued reimbursement checks that were signed by the principal and were not supported by any or sufficient receipts in violation of the CPS Insider’s Guide to School Business and Internal Accounts. The investigation also proved that the principal resided in Richton Park, IL. The principal was subsequently terminated from CPS employment. (5736)
An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school clerk utilized school funds to pay for personal items that the clerk had purchased using the school's credit cards. The investigation proved that the school clerk utilized a school credit card to make $17,210.49 in personal purchases during which time the account was charged $3,179.42 in finance charges and fees and nine school checks totaling $6,414.75 were issued to make payments on the account. The investigation also revealed that the school clerk made personal purchases utilizing another school credit card, however the total amount of personal purchases made by the school clerk and the extent to which the school's internal accounts paid for these purchases could not be accurately determined. During the course of the investigation, the school clerk resigned from her position with CPS and contemporaneously made a $10,000 personal payment on the credit card account. The employee was subsequently designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5810)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a guidance counselor assistant assigned to an elementary school utilized a school credit card to purchase personal items without paying sales tax. The guidance counselor assistant was issued school based discipline. (6253)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school lunchroom manager which revealed that the lunchroom manager failed to deposit in a timely fashion lunchroom receipts that the lunchroom manager had documented as collected and deposited resulting in $7,211.41 being unaccounted for. The investigation further revealed that a central office department responsible for monitoring the deposits failed to notice that the school's lunchroom revenues were not being deposited despite receiving Daily Cashier’s Reports from the school and despite available reports reflecting that deposits were not being made. Following the OIG investigation, the lunchroom manager was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6516)

A similar investigation revealed that an elementary school lunchroom manager failed to deposit in a timely fashion lunchroom receipts that were documented as collected and deposited resulting in $16,697.52 being unaccounted for. The lunchroom manager was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6683)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an employee on a miscellaneous payroll at a high school cashed a CPS payroll check, after requesting a replacement check claiming that the payroll check had not been received and after cashing the replacement check. The employee reimbursed CPS and was issued school based discipline. (6052)

A similar investigation revealed that another employee on a miscellaneous payroll at a high school cashed a CPS payroll check, after requesting,
receiving and cashing a replacement check claiming that the payroll check had not been received. This employee also reimbursed CPS and was also issued school based discipline. (6087)

**Falsification of Attendance Records**

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher assistant, on at least three occasions, attended court regarding an arrest for aggravated driving under the influence while on CPS time and was paid for a full day’s work when in fact the teacher assistant attended court on parts of those days. The investigation also found that the teacher assistant utilized sick time on days that he was in custody or in court. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher assistant was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5449)

- An OIG investigation found that an alternative high school teacher assistant received pay for hours that she was actually attending classes at a local college. As a result of the OIG investigation, the teacher assistant received a 10-day suspension and reimbursed CPS $250.96. (5728)

- An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school engineer, on numerous occasions, falsified attendance records in that the engineer’s CPS Kronos time records reflected that the engineer was at work when in fact he was not at work. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that a school clerk assigned to the same elementary school edited her CPS Kronos time records to reflect that she was at work when in fact she was not at work. Following the OIG investigation, the engineer received a 15-day suspension and entered into a last chance agreement with CPS. The school clerk was issued school based discipline. (5776)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that, on nine occasions during a four-month period, an elementary school custodial worker falsified his attendance records by swiping in at schools other than the custodial worker’s assigned school so that his Kronos records would reflect that he was on time and working when in fact he was not on time and at work. The engineer was issued school based discipline. (6107)

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school watchman falsified his attendance records in that on numerous occasions he left his work site at the high school, allowed his brother to enter and remain at the school and had his brother, a non-CPS employee, swipe him out at the end of his scheduled shift. Following the OIG investigation, the watchman was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6232)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed that the teacher represented that homebound instruction was being provided
to two different students on numerous occasions when in fact it was not. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher forged the signature of the guardians of these two students on CPS time sheets. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher received more than $2,700.00 in pay for providing homebound instruction to the students that was not actually provided. Disciplinary action is pending against the teacher. (6644)

Falsification of School Records

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that a student was enrolled in a Head Start program despite the fact that the income of the student’s parents, who were CPS employees, exceeded the eligibility requirements of the program. The investigation revealed that an assistant principal at an elementary school and a high school computer technician provided false information on enrollment documents enabling their child to be enrolled in the Head Start program at the elementary school despite the fact that the family’s income exceeded the eligibility requirements of the program. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that a teacher at the elementary school was inattentive to her duty in allowing the student to enroll in the Head Start program at the elementary school despite the fact the teacher knowingly received and processed inaccurate enrollment forms regarding the family’s income. Disciplinary action is pending against the assistant principal and computer technician. The teacher was issued a 10-day suspension. (5953)

Misuse of the Internet

- An OIG investigation revealed that a high school teacher allowed her child to use a CPS issued laptop computer to download more than 1,200 pornographic images. The teacher was issued a five-day suspension. (6289)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school teacher which revealed that the teacher engaged in the unacceptable use of the CPS Network, in that the CPS Network was utilized to view sexually explicit material, in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher utilized the CPS Network to make on-line purchases of items for personal use, in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6509)

- A school psychologist was investigated by the OIG and was found to have utilized a CPS e-mail account to send images of pre-pubescent girls posing in swimwear, some in provocative poses, to a personal e-mail account. These images triggered filtering software on the CPS e-mail system. The OIG investigation further revealed that the images sent by the school psychologist to a personal account were not pornography, further no pornography was
found on a CPS laptop issued to the school psychologist or on any computers to which the school psychologist had access. Following the OIG investigation, the school psychologist was issued a five-day suspension. (6832)

➢ The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school teacher which revealed that the teacher utilized two CPS computers to access pornographic images over the internet, in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. The teacher was subsequently terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6901)

**Theft of CPS Property**

➢ The OIG conducted an investigation after receiving an allegation that two elementary school teachers were arrested for stealing two computer printers from a truck making a delivery to a CPS training center. The investigation revealed that the two teachers removed two printers from the back of a delivery truck that was in the process of delivering 75 printers to the training center. The teachers then brought the printers to their cars. The two teachers were subsequently arrested after security at the facility viewed a video that recorded the crime. The criminal charges against the teachers were dismissed. Both teachers were subsequently issued warning resolutions. (6282)

➢ After receiving notification from a downstate Illinois police department that a college student was found in possession of a CPS issued laptop computer, an OIG investigation revealed that the father of the college student worked part-time at a CPS elementary school. The OIG investigation further revealed that the laptop computer found in the possession of the college student was reported missing from the elementary school where the student’s father worked. The father, a part-time employee, was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6655)

**Breach Of Data Security**

➢ The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that a parent advocate assigned to a central office department e-mailed a list containing the names, student identification numbers and social security numbers of students in a specific program to other students in the program. The investigation found that the parent advocate, by emailing a list of the names and social security numbers of 18 students in the program to 33 students who were in the program, was inattentive to duty. Following the OIG investigation, the parent advocate received a five-day suspension. (6118)

➢ An OIG investigation of a team leader in a central office department revealed that the employee e-mailed a spreadsheet containing names and social
security numbers of 84 employees to coordinators and administrators of a program. The employee subsequently resigned from CPS employment pending disciplinary action. (6179)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an administrative assistant in a central office department e-mailed the social security numbers of 30 staff members of the department to other staff members, in violation of Board Rule 4-4(n) and the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The employee was issued a written reprimand. (6566)

- A telephone operator assigned to a central office department was the subject of an investigation which revealed that the employee erroneously sent, via United States mail, a copy of another employee's personnel file to a CPS employee. (6817)

**Vendor Misconduct**

- The OIG learned that a CPS vendor was debarred by the Illinois Department of Labor for violations of the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act (820 ILCS 130/1 et seq) and that the debarment prohibited the vendor from being awarded a contract or sub-contract on any public works contract for a two-year period. The OIG investigation further revealed that the vendor is subject to debarment by CPS for violations of the CPS Debarment Policy on Non-Responsible Persons in Procurement Transactions, CPS Policy Manual Section 401.6. Disciplinary action against the vendor is pending. (6111)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a vendor sold 110 refurbished laptop computers and 67 desktop computers, which were represented as new, to a CPS high school. In addition, the OIG investigation also revealed that the vendor failed to deliver all of the computers to the school after having been paid. Disciplinary action against the vendor is pending. (C366)

- An OIG investigation of two related vendors revealed that the first vendor engaged in stringing to avoid dollar thresholds requiring Chief Procurement Officer approval under Board Rule 5-4.1(b) and to avoid the $10,000.00 threshold requiring the school principal's approval of the transaction with the endorsement of the Local School Council. The OIG investigation revealed that the second vendor, which shared an office and employees with the first vendor, allowed the first vendor to utilize its name and vendor number to mask the fact that the first vendor was actually engaging in transactions with various CPS schools to circumvent the above listed dollar thresholds. Disciplinary action against the vendors is pending. (C383)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a CPS vendor providing consulting services at various schools, submitted falsified invoices
to these schools which reflected dates and times that the vendor did not in fact work. The OIG investigation further revealed that the agreements that the vendor entered into with various schools were not entered into under the authority of the Chicago Board of Education in violation of Board Rules. Disciplinary action against the vendor is pending. (C353)

- This same vendor was later investigated and was found to have had a direct economic interest in a company as a partner while she was also a CPS employee, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the vendor showed a lack of business integrity by doing work for CPS under the vendor number of another company to circumvent a CPS Department of Procurement and Contracts decision to suspend the vendor’s vendor number during the course of the previous OIG investigation, in violation of the CPS Debarment Policy on Non-Responsible Persons in Procurement Transactions. Disciplinary action against the vendor is pending. (6355)

**Residency**

To comply with the CPS Residency Policy, employees hired after November 20, 1996 must reside within the City of Chicago. The CPS Residency Policy mandates that employees, unless granted a waiver because they teach in an identified “special needs” area, must maintain a City of Chicago domicile defined as the one true, permanent home to which whenever they are absent they have an intention of returning. The OIG has been delegated the responsibility of investigating allegations of non-residency and in fact, the OIG receives more complaints of employees violating the Residency Policy than any other rule violation. In FY 08, the 155 complaints of alleged residency violations received by the OIG totaled more than 15% of all the complaints received by the OIG. To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly, consistently and equitably; to reduce animosity between those employees who abide by the residency requirement and those who do not, thereby enhancing employee production; and, to set the tone that CPS rules and policies must be adhered to, the OIG delegates resources to investigate alleged violations of the Residency Policy.

The Residency Policy reflects that employees who intentionally submit a false residential address to avoid the requirements of the policy have engaged in irremediable conduct punishable by discharge. In FY 08, the OIG issued the following reports on employees who intentionally submitted false residential addresses reflecting that they lived in the City of Chicago when in fact they did not. Based on an OIG recommendation, in each case the employees resigned from CPS employment, were terminated or were suspended without pay pending a hearing and most were designated as ineligible to be rehired.
A high school teacher was found to be residing in Rolling Meadows, IL. The teacher is currently suspended without pay pending a disciplinary hearing. (4175)

A professional III in a central office department resided in Aurora, IL. The employee was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (4382)

A central office technology employee resided in Freeport, IL. The employee was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (4496)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Olympia Fields, IL. The assistant principal was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (4542)

A high school teacher resided in Bolingbrook, IL. The teacher was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (4780)

An elementary school teacher resided in Skokie, IL. The teacher was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (4989)

A central office technology employee resided in Tinley Park, IL. The employee resigned in lieu of termination and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5511)

A central office technology employee resided in Hanover Park, IL. The employee was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5514)

A high school principal resided in Lynwood, IL. The principal subsequently resigned and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5575)

A central office employee resided in Glenwood, IL. The employee subsequently resigned and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5784)

A lunchroom manager resided in Dolton, IL. The lunchroom manager was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5785)

An elementary school teacher resided in Merrionette Park, IL. The teacher was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5814)

An elementary school teacher assistant resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The teacher assistant was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5848)
A school coordinator resided in Matteson, IL. The coordinator subsequently retired and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5871)

A central office administrative assistant resided in Glenwood, IL. The administrative assistant was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5885)

An elementary school assistant principal resided in Downers Grove, IL. The assistant principal was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5997)

A central office technology employee resided in Berwyn, IL. The employee was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6082)

An elementary school teacher resided in Forest Park, IL. The teacher was subsequently terminated. (6148)

A teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The teacher subsequently resigned and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6544)

A speech pathologist resided in Hazel Crest, IL. The speech pathologist resigned from CPS employment. (6600)

An elementary school principal resided in Richton Park, IL. The principal was subsequently terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6020)

Employees who do not intentionally provide a false residential address to avoid the residency requirement are allowed to remediate their misconduct by coming into compliance with the residency requirement. The following OIG investigations dealt with employees who did not provide a false residential address.

An elementary school teacher resided in Oak Lawn, IL. The teacher was issued a written reprimand and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (3760)

A high school instructor resided in Zion, IL. The instructor was granted a waiver from the residency requirement. (4035)

A school social worker resided in Country Club Hills, IL. The social worker was issued a warning resolution and was instructed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. After failing to do so, the school social worker was terminated. (4176)
A high school teacher resided in Chicago Ridge, IL. The teacher subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (4911)

An elementary school teacher resided in Skokie, IL. The teacher was issued a written reprimand and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5087)

A data analyst resided in Orland Park, IL. After being given a date to come into compliance with the residency requirement, the data analyst resigned from CPS. (5243)

An elementary school teacher resided in Niles, IL. The teacher subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5274)

An elementary school principal resided in Warrenville, IL. The principal was issued a warning resolution and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5409)

A central office manager resided in Aurora, IL. The manager was issued a written reprimand and was directed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (5510)

An elementary school teacher resided in Park Forest, IL. The teacher was issued a warning resolution and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5608)

An elementary school teacher resided in Flossmoor, IL. The teacher was issued a written reprimand and was subsequently terminated for failing to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (5745)

An elementary school teacher resided in Naperville, IL. The teacher was issued a warning resolution and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5798)

An elementary school teacher resided in Bolingbrook, IL. The teacher was issued a written reprimand and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (5904)

A lunchroom attendant resided in Lincolnwood, IL. The lunchroom attendant was issued a written reprimand and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6138)

A director of a central office department resided in Evergreen Park, IL. The director was issued a written reprimand and was directed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (6401)
A head teacher at a high school resided in LaGrange, IL. Disciplinary action is pending. (6512)

A central office professional III resided in New Lenox, IL. The professional III resigned from CPS employment when directed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (6612)

A central office professional III resided in Plainfield, IL. The professional III was issued a written reprimand and subsequently retired from CPS employment when directed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (6613)

A central office professional III resided in South Elgin, IL. The professional III was issued a written reprimand and subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6614)

A central office professional III resided in Wauconda, IL. The professional III was issued a written reprimand and subsequently resigned from CPS employment when directed to come into compliance with the residency requirement. (6615)

A high school teacher resided in Berwyn, IL. The teacher was issued a warning resolution for this residency violation and other misconduct. The teacher subsequently came into compliance with the residency requirement. (6616)

An elementary school teacher resided in Villa Park, IL. The teacher was subsequently terminated for other reasons before being disciplined for this residency violation. (6757)

**Tuition Fraud**

The Office of the Inspector General has been delegated the responsibility of conducting investigations into allegations that various Chicago Public School students reside outside the City of Chicago, a violation of the Illinois School Code. In FY 08, three of these investigations conducted by the OIG found that CPS employees falsified their children’s residential address and enrolled their children in CPS or a CPS licensed charter school despite residing in the suburbs. In five of the tuition fraud investigations, the Chicago Board of Education found that the parents of the students who resided in the suburbs and attended CPS were liable for a total of $370,375.00 in tuition payments to CPS. The CPS Law Department will now seek to recover those funds from the parents of those students. In addition, in three other investigations conducted in FY 08, the OIG found that parents of students who attended CPS despite residing in the suburbs are responsible for total tuition payments of $87,572.00. If those findings are
approved by the Board of Education, the total recovery of tuition payments for tuition fraud investigations conducted in FY 08 would be $457,947.00.

During the course of FY 08, the OIG conducted investigations regarding tuition fraud that yielded the following results:

- A school business manager enrolled her son in a CPS high school and fraudulently misrepresented that they lived in Chicago when in fact, as the investigation revealed, they resided in South Holland, IL. The business manager was terminated from CPS employment and, as a result of the investigation, the Chicago Board of Education made a determination that the student’s parent was responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $17,619.00. The CPS Law Department is seeking to collect those funds from the parent. (6271)

- A CPS employee on a leave of absence enrolled her child in a CPS licensed charter school and fraudulently misrepresented that the child resided in the City of Chicago. The OIG investigation revealed that the student resided in Dolton, IL. It was subsequently discovered that the employee had other children who previously attended CPS and the CPS licensed charter school for a number of years. As a result of the OIG investigation, and the subsequent discovery of other children who lived in the suburbs when attending CPS, the CPS employee is responsible for payment of non-resident tuition in the total amount of $151,138.00. (5046)

- In a related investigation to the one mentioned above, an OIG investigation revealed that a parent enrolled a child at a CPS licensed charter school despite residing in Dolton, IL. Following the OIG investigation, the Chicago Board of Education found that the parent was responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $47,535.00. (5046)

- A CPS high school teacher was found to be residing in South Holland, IL. The investigation also revealed that the teacher’s child attended a CPS classical elementary school despite also residing in the suburbs. The investigation further revealed that the teacher also falsified attendance records by not working a full day. The teacher is currently suspended without pay and further disciplinary action is pending. As a result of the investigation, the OIG recommended that the teacher pay non-resident tuition on behalf of the child in the amount of $43,524.00. (6130)

- Two CPS students, one attending a CPS selective enrollment high school and the other attending a CPS elementary school, were found to be residing in Dolton, IL with their parents. Following the OIG investigation, the Chicago Board of Education determined that the parents were responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $101,225.00. (4469)
An OIG investigation found that three siblings resided in Markham, IL and attended a CPS elementary school. Following the OIG investigation, the Chicago Board of Education found that the parents of the children were responsible for the payment of non-resident tuition in the amount of $52,858.00. (6261)

An OIG investigation revealed that a student who attended a CPS selective enrollment high school actually resided in Lincolnwood, IL. The OIG recommended that the parents of the student pay non-resident tuition in the amount of $17,619.00. (6618)

An OIG investigation revealed that two siblings attended a CPS selective enrollment high school despite residing in Niles, IL. The OIG recommended that the parents of the students pay non-resident tuition in the amount of $26,429.00. (6623)

**Criminal Conduct**

The OIG received notification that a child welfare attendant was arrested for the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The OIG investigation revealed that the child welfare attendant subsequently plead guilty to the charge and was sentenced to serve a two year term of probation. The investigation further revealed that the child welfare attendant falsified his attendance records in that on two occasions, Kronos records reflect that the child welfare attendant worked a full day when in fact he attended court for part of the day. In addition, the child welfare attendant utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that on six occasions, Kronos records reflect that the child welfare attendant represented that he was sick when in fact he was in court. Following the OIG investigation, the child welfare attendant was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5311)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher was arrested for the offense of possession of cannabis and the teacher admitted to the OIG that she knowingly possessed cannabis when arrested. The criminal charges against the teacher were dismissed after the teacher completed a drug abuse program. The teacher subsequently resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5726)

The OIG received notification that a high school teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of domestic battery. The OIG investigation revealed that the charge was later upgraded to the felony offense of aggravated domestic battery. The teacher plead guilty to the charge of aggravated domestic battery and was sentenced to three years and six months in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The teacher was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5831)
The OIG conducted an investigation of a high school clerk who was arrested for the offense of domestic battery. The school clerk was subsequently charged with the offenses of domestic battery and reckless conduct. The school clerk was found guilty of reckless conduct, sentenced to a one year term of supervision and ordered to attend parenting classes. The OIG investigation also revealed that the school clerk utilized sick time in an unauthorized manner in that on at least three occasions, Kronos records reflect that the school clerk represented that she was sick when in fact she was in court. The school clerk was issued school based discipline. (5894)

An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school teacher assistant was arrested and charged with the offenses of patronizing a prostitute and possession of cannabis after Chicago police officers observed the teacher in a sexual act with a prostitute. After being placed under arrest, officers searched the teacher assistant and found the teacher assistant to be in possession of three plastic bags of cannabis. The criminal charges against the teacher assistant were dismissed after successful completion of a drug program. The OIG investigation further revealed that the teacher assistant received full pay, without deduction of benefit time for two days when the teacher assistant attended criminal court. The teacher assistant was issued school based discipline. (6263)

A substitute teacher was arrested and charged with the offense of attempted aggravated arson. The OIG investigation revealed that the substitute teacher plead guilty to the charge of attempted aggravated arson and was sentenced to four years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The substitute teacher was subsequently terminated from CPS and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5928)

A high school porter was arrested for the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The subsequent OIG investigation revealed that although the criminal charges against the porter were dismissed, the porter admitted in an interview with the OIG that he recently snorted cocaine. The OIG investigation further revealed that the porter used sick time when in fact he was not sick but in court regarding his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. The investigation also revealed that the porter engaged in secondary employment without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The porter was issued school based discipline. (5989)

A school security officer assigned to an elementary school was alleged to be involved in some internal thefts at the school. The subsequent OIG investigation revealed that the security officer had recently been convicted of the felony offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was sentenced to serve an eighteen month term of probation. The OIG
investigation further revealed that the security officer failed to notify the Chief Executive Officer of his conviction; falsified his attendance records by attending criminal court on CPS time; used sick leave on days he attended court; engaged in secondary employment without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer; and was arrested again and charged with the offense of assault while on duty for CPS. The security officer was terminated and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6027, 6399)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher was arrested out-of-state for the offenses of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute and possession of drugs by an inmate. The investigation further revealed that the criminal charges against the teacher were dismissed. Following the OIG investigation, the teacher was terminated from CPS employment. (6543)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that an elementary school teacher assistant was arrested for possession of cannabis, drinking alcohol on a public way and various traffic offenses. The teacher subsequently plead guilty to the offense of possession of cannabis and was sentenced to serve a three month term of supervision. During an interview with the OIG, the teacher assistant stated that he smokes marijuana about two times a week. The teacher assistant was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6664)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of a school bus aide assigned to a high school. The OIG investigation revealed that the school bus aide, while engaging in secondary employment at a care facility, committed the offense of sexual misconduct with a person with a disability who was a residential client of the care facility. This act of sexual misconduct was investigated by the Chicago Police Department, however criminal charges were not filed. The OIG investigation revealed that the school bus aide’s acts of sexual misconduct with a residential client of a care facility, although committed while off-duty from CPS employment, were so egregious that the acts warranted the school bus aide’s immediate discharge from CPS employment especially in light of the school bus aide’s role and duties as a school bus aide. Following the OIG investigation, the school bus aide was terminated from CPS employment and was designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6680)

- After learning that a high school teacher shot and killed her estranged husband, the OIG conducted an investigation that included interviews of detectives as well as high school personnel and the teacher. During the course of the investigation, the OIG learned that the teacher shot her estranged husband after a purported altercation in which the teacher feared for her life. Criminal charges have not been filed against the teacher. The OIG investigation also revealed that the teacher had engaged in prior acts of
violence and threats to co-workers. Disciplinary action against the teacher is currently pending. (5695)

**On-Duty Criminal Conduct**

- An OIG investigation revealed that a student special services advocate was arrested and charged with the offense of battery after allegedly striking a co-worker. The charge was later amended to disorderly conduct and the employee plead guilty to the charge and was sentenced to one year of court supervision. The OIG investigation also revealed that the employee was paid for working a full day on at least two days she attended court. The employee was issued a five-day suspension. (6364)

- A substitute teacher assigned to a high school was arrested for the offense of battery after striking another employee. The substitute teacher was found not guilty of battery. However, the OIG investigation revealed that the substitute teacher falsified his CPS attendance records in that on five occasions he represented that he worked a full day when in fact he did not since he was attending court while on CPS time. The substitute teacher has been terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (5648)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a contracted provider of dental services to CPS students was arrested for the offense of disorderly conduct after making terrorism-related threats to various staff members at an elementary school. Following the investigation, the dental provider was removed from providing dental services to CPS students. (6002)

- The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that a contracted landscaper plead guilty to the offense of battery of a 12 year old CPS student. The OIG learned that the charges arose out of a sexual relationship between the 12 year old female CPS student and the landscaper. The landscaper was removed from working on any CPS contracts. (6088)

- An elementary school engineer was arrested while on duty and charged with the offenses of violating an order of protection and possession of cannabis. The OIG investigation revealed that the engineer subsequently plead guilty to the charge of violating an order of protection and was sentenced to serve an 18 month term of supervision. The possession of cannabis charge against the engineer was dismissed. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the engineer falsified his attendance records by receiving pay for a full day of work on the day he was arrested and on a day he attended criminal court. Finally, the OIG investigation revealed that the engineer engaged in secondary employment without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, in
violation of the CPS Code of Ethics. The engineer received school based discipline. (6209)

Criminal Background

- The OIG received an allegation that a substitute teacher had a criminal background. The OIG investigation revealed that the substitute teacher was convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance in Texas in 1988, was sentenced to a term of probation, and was later sentenced to a five year term of imprisonment after violating his probation. Therefore, pursuant to the School Code of Illinois, the substitute teacher was precluded from being employed by CPS. The OIG investigation further revealed that the substitute teacher falsified CPS employment records by failing to disclose his conviction for possession of a controlled substance on a CPS employment application. The substitute teacher was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6370)

- A school security officer was investigated following a complaint that the security officer had been arrested. The OIG investigation revealed that the security officer had been arrested for the offense of domestic battery in 2004, plead guilty and was sentenced to serve an 18 month term of conditional discharge. In 2008, the security officer plead guilty to violating his sentence of conditional discharge after having been recommitted to his sentence of conditional discharge on prior occasions. Also in 2008, the security officer was sentenced to serve 124 days in the Cook County Department of Corrections. (6861)

Miscellaneous investigations

- An OIG investigation revealed that an elementary school lunchroom attendant submitted three falsified CPS documents and information to a childcare agency which caused the agency to provide the lunchroom attendant with more than $47,000 in child day-care assistance to which the lunchroom attendant was not entitled. The lunchroom attendant resigned from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6025)

- The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a manager assigned to a central office department utilized a CPS fax machine and the CPS e-mail system to distribute and receive information regarding personal business activities in violation of the CPS Member Acceptable Use of the CPS Network policy. In addition, the OIG investigation revealed that the manager obtained and accepted secondary employment without first notifying the CPS Ethics Officer, in violation of the Code of Ethics for the Chicago Board of Education. The OIG investigation also revealed that the manager had been previously disciplined, once for the same type of misconduct. The manager subsequently retired from CPS in lieu of disciplinary action. (5972)
An OIG investigation revealed that a school community representative at a high school falsified her employment records by failing to disclose all of her previous places of employment on a CPS employment application. Specifically, the school community representative failed to indicate on a CPS Employment Application that from 1997 to 2005, she was the principal of a charter school that had previously been investigated by the OIG and is currently under federal investigation for financial irregularities. The school community representative was terminated from CPS employment and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6331)

The OIG conducted an investigation which revealed that a central office manager, during a 23-day period, utilized 12 sick days, in combination with vacation days and unpaid excused days, to take a vacation to Pakistan, in violation of the CPS Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy. The OIG investigation also revealed that in another 18-day period, the manager utilized two sick days, in combination with vacation days and unpaid days, to take a vacation to London, England. (6123)

The OIG conducted an investigation of an elementary school lunchroom attendant which revealed that the lunchroom attendant, on at least two occasions, manipulated CPS stationary and/or forged the signature of a CPS employee in order to provide false information to a child care agency for the purpose of securing child care. The OIG investigation also revealed that the lunchroom attendant made false statements to an OIG investigator during an official investigation. The lunchroom attendant subsequently resigned and has been designated as ineligible to be rehired. (6319)